The Development of a Manufacturing Failure Mode Avoidance Framework for Aerospace Manufacturing by Goodland, James
 University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
  
© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons 
Licence. 
 
 
 
The Development of a Manufacturing Failure  
Mode Avoidance Framework for Aerospace  
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James GOODLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for 
 the degree of Masters of Science under Bradford  
Programme of Engineering Quality Improvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Engineering and Informatics  
 
University of Bradford 
 
2016 
i 
 
Abstract 
James Goodland 
The Development of a Manufacturing Failure Mode Avoidance Framework for 
Aerospace Manufacturing 
Key Words: Failure Mode Avoidance, Process FMEA, Aerospace Manufacture 
 
In order to remain competitive in the global market businesses are under ever 
increasing pressure to ramp up production rates whilst simultaneously 
improving cost effectiveness to allow continued profitable growth. This 
requirement is particularly challenging in high value manufacturing which is 
characterised by expensive product and manufacturing systems and relatively 
low production volume. 
This thesis introduces a method for the design of robust and reliable 
manufacturing processes through the prevention of identified potential failure 
modes that is based on the principles of the existing Failure Mode Avoidance 
framework used for automotive system design. 
The tools and techniques that exist in the literature are reviewed in order to 
understand the best practice, and subsequently a Manufacturing Failure Mode 
Avoidance framework is designed. This framework is demonstrated through two 
unique case studies conducted in a real life manufacturing environment in order 
to validate its appropriateness to provide robust countermeasures to failure 
which will allow right first time manufacture.  
The outcomes of the implementations are discussed, conclusions drawn and 
opportunities for further research are provided.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The Defence Industry 
Due to business consolidation through mergers and acquisitions within the 
defence industry compounded with, and arguably catalysed by, continuing 
heavy reductions in worldwide defence budget spending (Deloitte 2013), the 
aerospace market is more competitive than ever with huge, long term make or 
break contracts becoming an ever increasing reality (Gabbai 2005).  Contracts 
of this nature bring with them huge costs due to programme developments, long 
pay-back periods and ever greater technological complexity but provide 
financial advantages in terms of economies of scale and temporary security. For 
example, in terms of large civil aircraft production, every doubling of production 
reduces unit costs by around 20% (Commission of the European Communities, 
1997). Additionally, investment in technological capabilities and assets is 
stimulated by the confidence that comes with the confirmation of new contracts 
improving the abilities of a business to win future orders.  
This describes the scenario that is being experienced by the large, multinational 
aerospace Company where this research has been carried out. This 
organisation can boast a prestigious history of pioneering engineering 
accomplishments in both the civil and military markets and consequently 
possesses a work force with a wealth of experience and expertise in developing 
and applying ground-breaking technologies, which has proved pivotal in the 
delivery of aircraft programmes. Due to the nature of the business, details of the 
Company are not included in this research. This does not have any detrimental 
effect on this research.  
Despite previous successes there are a number of current pressures that are 
being exerted on the Company due to the current market environment. Firstly, 
there is intense worldwide competition from a number of other manufacturers 
and distributors that produce and sell similar products, which can be illustrated 
by the amalgamation in the US to just a few principal contractors (MarketLine, 
2011). Also, the dependency on large contracts outlined previously, brings an 
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additional risk associated with their loss or expiration, and with the cost of 
developing a bid starting in the order of millions of pounds, the need to secure 
and execute a contract is critical to commercial survival. Furthermore, the 
increasing hostility of the financial environment has made fixed price contracts 
ever more common. Contracts of this nature pose inherent risks as actual 
performance costs can be difficult to predict over the programmes duration and 
are liable to spiral out of control. Failure to predict and prevent technical issues 
and accurately estimate and control costs can have huge impacts on 
profitability. Finally, the economic presence that organisations of this magnitude 
have means that their performance regularly makes the headlines; News of 
poor or uncertain performance quickly spreads, with resultant damages to the 
Organisation’s reputation being incalculable, but certainly represented through 
share value.  
No consumer, independent of the scale or even the required urgency of 
procurement, can deny that price is one of the most pivotal factors in the 
decision making process, which becomes even more prevalent when 
competitors offer similar packages in terms of performance and continuing 
service throughout the product’s life cycle (Hill, 1993). As a result, in order to 
remain competitive on price, suppliers need to be confident that they can 
maximise profits through reduction of costs, increasing shareholder value and 
market share. This means only one thing; minimising the costs of delivery.  
However, in the last 5 years the Company has lost two contracts valued in the 
order of billions of pounds, which have been largely attributed to their high cost 
estimates. Meanwhile, secured programmes have also proved challenging 
encountering major technical problems which have led to years of delays and 
huge cost overruns. In an attempt to reduce the impact of these issues, a high 
level of concurrency has been adopted, which means that design, development 
and production of the aircraft are conducted simultaneously. Consequently, 
significant numbers of aircraft are being ordered and manufactured before the 
design is mature and the aircraft has been fully tested.  Although concurrency 
within design has been demonstrated to be largely effective in the manufacture 
of quality products (Miller, 1993), conducting major production phases in 
parallel, rather than in a safer, linear progression, brings a high level of risk as 
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any problems encountered during the testing and development will require all of 
these early aircraft to be expensively modified, potentially rendering existing 
manufacturing processes and associated systems redundant. Furthermore, 
there is increased pressure due to demands for an increase of production rates, 
with aims to improve throughput by over 10 times what is currently achieved.  
1.1.2 Aerospace Manufacturing 
High value manufacturing is characterised by the production of high cost, low 
volume products. The value of the products is attributed to their superior 
performance capability, achieved through the application of intelligent design 
and manufacturing, reliant on complex and highly accurate manufacturing 
centres to produce components and assemblies to precision tolerances from 
expensive, high performance materials.  
There are few better examples of high value manufacturing than in the 
aerospace sector, particularly in terms of military aerospace manufacture which 
demands the peak of the available capabilities, where performance trade-offs 
are not welcome considerations. Although contracts consist of relatively low 
order numbers, typically in the order of tens or hundreds rather than thousands 
of aircraft, due to the product’s complexity, and the sheer number of systems, 
assemblies and components that they consist of, the variety of parts is still very 
high (Asif and Webb, 2013).  
Traditionally, aerospace manufacturing has operated in a fashion typical of 
batch or even job production, relying on a highly skilled and experienced work 
force utilising accurate machining centres with a craftsmanship mentality. 
Historically, an aircraft consisting of thousands upon thousands of individual 
components would be manufactured and assembled in an almost bespoke 
manner. Inherently, this strategy relies heavily on continuous inspection of each 
single part, reflecting a ‘design – build – test’ approach which is not only a huge 
time expense but, upon the event that defects are detected, leads to a large 
amount of reactive activities associated with non-conformance, such as 
concession, rework and scrap, which are non-value adding and incur huge 
financial costs which consequently impact on profits. Despite technological 
improvements leading to a step change in the level of precision that modern 
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manufacturing centres are capable of, high investment is still made into part 
inspection due to the potentially fatal risks associated with the failure of such 
complex systems when used in the field. The result is a culture that has 
matured and plateaued, rather than evolved with the developments in part and 
process control technology. 
1.2 Current Practice  
This description is reflective of the current practice within the Company. Specific 
problems include; 
Unacceptably high levels of out-of-specification products with associated high 
levels of rework and associated extra costs and delays 
 Current practice does not include a process for ‘closing the loop’, i.e. the 
focus is on containment actions rather than addressing systemic root 
cause 
 No rigorous application of process tools to assess potential failures in the 
manufacturing processes  
 Highly complex manufacturing processes with intricate relationships 
between part and process parameters which consequently presents 
opportunity for variation to influence the process output 
 Cultural issues which obstruct dialogue between different parts of the 
Company’s operations, e.g. engineering design and manufacturing  
There is a need to improve the level of parts that are right first time by moving 
away from reactive, containment actions and towards preventative 
manufacturing strategies that allow consistent delivery of quality components 
and assemblies, reducing the cost of poor quality and improving the profitability 
of manufacture. 
1.2.1 Parity with Challenges Experienced in the Automotive Industry 
The Company’s current situation and challenges are analogous of the 
automotive industry during the transition from craftsmanship production to mass 
production and then to lean production that occurred throughout the 20th 
century; a need to produce quality products at higher rates and lower costs.  
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1.2.1.1 Mass Production 
Similarly to traditional aerospace manufacturing, prior to the early 1900s 
automotive manufacturing comprised of highly skilled work forces developed 
through apprenticeships, decentralized organisations, use of general purpose 
machine tools to complete a variety of operations and very low production 
volumes (Womack, 1991). Effectively, this was the pinnacle of high value 
manufacturing in this era.  
Henry Ford was able to secure majority market share by making automobiles 
affordable to the masses, designing the Model T so that it could be 
manufactured easily and therefore produced and sold cheaply. The key to mass 
production was the complete and consistent interchangability of parts, which 
provided simplicity in attaching them to one another (Womack, 1991), 
eliminating huge time costs incurred by modifying components so that they 
would mate effectively. The latter scenario is prevalent in manufacture at the 
Company. For instance, wing and fuselage skins are tailored to airframes using 
liquid shims and adaptive machining to ensure a precision fit (However, it is 
appreciated that the precision of modern aerospace components is in a different 
league to those of early automobiles.). 
Fordist mass production worked on the premise of constant movement of the 
line meaning that defect parts were obliviously and continuously passed down 
stream. Once a defective part had become embedded in a vehicle, lengthy 
inspection would be required to identify it and further work required to rectify it, 
whilst similarly defective vehicles are continually built before the cause of the 
problem was found and understood.  
In contrast, the development of Lean production meant that the manufacturing 
system was designed so that the line could be stopped immediately upon the 
identification of a defect; viewing the event as an opportunity for improvement 
rather than as problem. Instead of treating each non-conforming part as 
random, repairing each error and hoping it did not happen again; production 
would cease until a solution to prevent the problem from occurring had been 
devised. Initially, this method led to frequent disturbances in production but as 
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the organisation improved at identifying root causes and the number of errors 
began to drop rapidly (Womack, 1991).  
This demonstrates a significant transformation in ideology from quality control to 
quality assurance; from part to part control to control of the process so that it 
yields quality parts. This attitude leads to continual improvement of the 
manufacturing process so that it is less susceptible to causes of faults. As a 
result, this system became far more effective in controlling quality than the 
mass production approach (Monden, 1988). 
These examples have effectively demonstrated the appeal within manufacturing 
of producing interchangeable components consistently, whilst continuously 
improving the detection and correction of deviations as soon as possible during 
the manufacturing cycle and the benefits that these factors can yield in terms of 
reduction of waste as a means to enhance profitability. However, the 
opportunity to identify possible defects even earlier in the manufacturing time 
line, perhaps before the first component is even made, has greater allure that 
would equate to even improved prospects of efficiency. 
1.2.1.2 Failure Mode Avoidance 
The concept of preventing failures prior to their occurrence is central to the 
Failure Mode Avoidance (FMA) philosophy. FMA provides a means to prevent 
potential failures, or ‘failure modes’, being designed into complex automotive 
product systems. Through a pragmatic approach, the FMA strategy ensures 
that all potential failure modes are systematically identified and robust 
countermeasures implemented early in the design process, when the freedom 
for change is largest (Campean and Henshall, 2009). 
Research suggests that despite huge advances in technology that allow 
computational modelling and rapid prototyping of automotive components and 
assemblies, the effectiveness of the product’s development is still constricted by 
late engineering changes, which appear in the form of countermeasures to 
design failures (Cash, 2003). Furthermore, it was discovered that 80% of the 
late design changes could have been avoided by using existing tools and 
knowledge. The FMA approach has demonstrated effectiveness through 
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industrial case studies (Campean et al., 2013) (Campean, Henshall and Rutter, 
2013) and has been adopted by automotive manufacturers (Zhou, 2005). 
1.3 Need for Research 
By marrying the themes that have been explored in the section, there was a 
need for research to provide a solution to the challenges experienced by the 
Company. In essence, high global competitiveness combined with demands to 
increase production rates requires the Company to manufacture parts at greater 
cost effectiveness. Following a mass production paradigm provides an 
opportunity to increase rates, but at a risk of incurring unsustainable costs due 
to defective part production that is hard to resolve. The adoption of lean 
concepts and a process control approach provides an alternative, but even the 
initial defects and disruption is undesirable and better avoided entirely. Finally, 
the development of Failure Mode Avoidance within automotive manufacture 
demonstrates an approach to identify and prevent design failures from 
occurring.  
An opportunity existed to adopt the Failure Mode Avoidance strategy used for 
automotive system design and apply it to manufacturing process design, 
operation and control. This strategy aids in the transition of the Company from a 
craftsmanship mentality, with emphasis on conformance on a part basis and a 
reactive approach to defects, to a process based manufacturer, allowing efforts 
to be focussed on process control which facilitates the reduction of cost of non-
conformance whilst allowing increases in productivity. 
This required the development and implementation of a structured and 
systematic framework similar to that used in Failure Mode Avoidance; allowing 
identification of the factors that influence process variability and part quality, and 
their management through effective manufacturing process countermeasures 
and controls. Based on the current situation, the following criteria were outlined 
for such a framework; 
 Manage the complexity of aerospace manufacturing processes  
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 Identify and understand the interfaces, exchanges and dependencies 
between part and process characteristics and the process environment, 
identifying key sources of variation 
 Systematically identify and prioritise potential process failures, their root 
causes and their downstream effects on the process 
 Develop and deploy robust countermeasures for the avoidance of critical 
failures 
 Validate and monitor in-process the effectiveness of the deployed 
countermeasures through dynamic process controls  
 Document the analysis in order to ‘close the loop’ through lessons learnt 
for process knowledge reuse 
 Deploy effectively within the Company’s employees and culture 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research was to develop a Manufacturing Failure Mode 
Avoidance (MFMA) framework that meets the criteria described above and to 
test its feasibility through practical case study applications.  
The key objectives to achieve this aim were; 
 Complete a literature review into manufacturing quality methods and how 
they are applied  
 Develop a MFMA framework that utilises the strength of existing methods 
 Trial the proposed MFMA framework in a real life environment 
 Discuss the applicability of the MFMA framework based on the results of 
the practical case studies 
1.5 Research Methodology  
The method that has been used to conduct this research was as follows; 
1. Carry out a critical review of current literature 
2. Evaluate critically the current practice at the Company 
3. Develop a MFMA framework based on the findings of the literature 
review and gap analysis with current processes used in the Company 
4. Plan the validation of the MFMA framework through practical case 
studies 
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5. Carry out the first case study, evaluate results and refine the MFMA 
framework accordingly 
6. Carry out a second case study with exposure to members of the 
organisation 
7. Discuss results 
8. Draw conclusions and provide recommendations for further study 
 
This research was conducted as part of a Knowledge Transfer Partnership 
(KTP) with the University of Bradford and the Company, and with support from 
Innovate UK, who were known as the Technology Strategy Board at the 
beginning of this project. The Author’s role was that of KTP Associate, tasked 
with developing and implementing the MFMA framework. This provided the 
opportunity for the Author to have access to the Company’s facilities in order to 
conduct observations and case studies. Unless otherwise stated, the work 
demonstrated in this thesis has been conducted by the Author with combined 
support from staff members at the Company and University of Bradford. The 
original plan for the KTP project can be found in Appendix D. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
The structure of this thesis is as follows; 
Literature review – This section provides a review of existing quality 
manufacturing strategies, methods and tools with a discussion of their strengths 
and weaknesses. Failure Mode Avoidance is examined, its philosophies and the 
mechanisms by which it works in order to understand how an equivalent 
strategy for manufacturing process control design is achieved.   
Research Methodology – In this section, the current practice of the Company 
is discussed and compared to the findings from the Literature Review. Based on 
this analysis, the MFMA framework is outlined and its mechanics are described. 
The research objectives are described and a methodology is provided that 
describes how practical case studies are used to validate the MFMA framework. 
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Case Study 1 – This section describes the environment and aims, 
demonstrates the results, provides a discussion and identifies areas of 
improvement that result from the first case study. 
Case Study 2 - This section describes the environment and aims and 
demonstrates the results from the second case study. 
Discussion – A detailed discussion of the outcomes of the second cases study, 
including the strengths and weaknesses of the MFMA framework based on the 
two practical case study implementations. The suitability of the case studies is 
discussed and any advancement on the literature described.  
Conclusion – This section provides a summary of the work, the conclusions 
that can be made and the opportunities for further study. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Quality  
2.1.1 Defining Quality 
The word quality is used on a daily basis, with most people having a conceptual 
understanding of the term, generally implying a level of value and relating it to 
the number of desirable features possessed by a product or service. Although 
this loose meaning is adequate for typical conversation, a more precise 
definition is required. 
There are many overlapping academic interpretations of the term ‘Quality’. J. M. 
Juran (1974), commonly referred to as ‘The Father of Quality’, simply states that 
‘Quality is fitness for use’. This succinct summary demonstrates credibility 
through adoption in many texts including Hoyle (1997), Montgomery (2000), 
Bicheno (2002) and Oakland (2003), but does not provide any insight into what 
qualifies a product or service as fit for use.   
Crosby’s (1979) definition that ‘quality is conformance to requirements’ is 
consistent with Juran’s, and just as concise, but begins to add an element of 
engineering context by connecting it with requirements set for a product or 
service. This idea is harmonious with the definition provided by the British 
Standard Institute (BS 4778-2, 1991), that quality is ‘the totality of features and 
characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or 
implied needs’. However, neither of these statements provides insight into who 
determines the requirements of a product or service.  
Ishikawa (1976) had the belief that quality begins with the customer, highlighted 
in the 11 points he uses to summarise his quality philosophy, of which one is 
‘The first step is to know the customer requirements’ (Bicheno, 2002).  Similarly, 
Oakland (2003) stresses the importance of managing quality by relating it to the 
customer and this is reflected in his brief definition that ‘Quality is meeting the 
requirements of the customer’ and Bodek in his foreword to Handbook of 
Quality Tools, provides an almost repetitive concept that quality ‘means 
delivering products and services that 1) meet the customers standards 2) meet 
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and fulfil customer needs and 3) meet the customer expectations’ (Asaka and 
Ozeki, 1990).  
From these definitions, it is justifiable to say that quality parts and services 
consist of adherence to requirements set by the customer and through 
extrapolation of this idea, it can be said that the product or service must add 
value to the customer. Whilst these definitions seem sufficient, none of them 
provide an insight into how quality is created by an organisation. However, 
Feigenbaum (1991) gives a holistic definition that quality is ‘the total composite 
product and service characteristics of marketing, engineering, manufacture, and 
maintenance through which the product and service in use will meet the 
expectation by the customer’. 
2.1.2 Quality in Manufacturing  
Montgomery (2000) gives further reference to the concept of quality in 
manufacture, by dividing the ‘fitness for use’ description into two general 
aspects; Quality of design and quality of conformance. Through this means, he 
refers to quality of design as the ability of the product or service to meet the 
requirements desired by the customer, but attributes the quality of conformance 
to how well the product conforms to the specifications set by the design. The 
latter aspect of quality is affected primarily by the manufacturing of the product, 
or the delivery of the service, by factors such as the choice of the manufacturing 
process, the training and supervision of the workforce, the types of process 
controls and inspection methods employed and even the motivation of the 
workforce to achieve the quality required, along with multiple other influences 
and sources of variation (Montgomery, 2000). Oakland (2003) echoes this view, 
and adds that customer satisfaction must be designed into the production 
system. Consequently, both Montgomery (2000) and Oakland (2003) prefer a 
modern definition of quality; Quality is inversely proportional to variability.  
As a result, with respect to the manufacturing industry, the duty of the quality 
department is to reduce the level of variation within the manufacture of their 
products. Taguchi (1993) provides a very succinct definition of quality 
engineering; the purpose of quality engineering is to conduct the research 
necessary to develop robust technologies and methods that increase the 
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competitiveness of new products by reducing their cost and improving their 
quality; this enables the manufacturing enterprise to survive in the highly 
competitive global market. 
J. M. Juran (1998) provides a definition of quality in terms of two critical 
aspects; 
1. Quality means those features of products which meet the customers’ 
needs and thereby provide customer satisfaction 
2. Quality means freedom from deficiencies – freedom from errors that 
require rework or that result in field failures, customer dissatisfaction, 
customer claims and so on  
 
What is interesting about the two aspects of quality that Juran describes is that 
the first relates to the income of the producer, as higher quality typically costs 
more to the consumer, whereas the second aspect is related to the cost to the 
producer, where higher quality costs less. 
2.1.2.1 Quality Standards 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has developed a series 
of standards for quality systems, since their foundation in 1946. The current 
version of the standard is known as the ISO9000 series, which is a generic 
standard that is applicable to any type of organisation, and is typically used to 
demonstrate a supplier’s ability to control its processes, and produce quality 
products and services (Montgomery, 2000).  
Montgomery (2000) identifies some problems with the ISO standard, stating that 
extensive effort is required to bring documentation in line with the standard, and 
therefore the focus is misplaced on paperwork rather than actual improvement 
action and that this phenomenon is exacerbated by Auditors who concentrate 
on the book keeping elements of the standards. He concludes that 
organisations would be better off developing their own appropriate quality 
systems and variability reduction efforts, which would be a more efficient use of 
time and money. 
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Incidentally, several industries have produced their own industry–specific 
standards. Examples include the QS 9000 for the automotive industry, AS 9100 
for the aerospace industry and TL 9000 for the telecommunications industry.  
2.1.2.1.1 QS 9000 
The aim of the QS 9000 is the development of fundamental quality systems that 
provide for continuous improvement, emphasizing defect prevention and the 
reduction of variation and waste in the supply chain (Chrysler, Ford and General 
Motors, 1998).  
The most relevant aspect of the QS 9000, in terms of tools that support a 
predictive process driven manufacturing engineering production approach, is 
the Advanced Product Quality Planning manual which provides guidelines 
designed to produce a product quality plan which will support the development 
of a product or service that will satisfy the customer (Chrysler, Ford and General 
Motors, 1995).  
2.1.2.2 Advanced Process Quality Planning  
The Advanced Quality planning and Control Plan reference manual was 
released by Chrysler, Ford and General Motors in 1994. The purpose of the 
manual is to communicate to internal and external suppliers, and to their 
subcontractors, the product quality planning and control plan guidelines, 
developed jointly by the three automotive companies, and to outline a structured 
method of defining and establishing the steps necessary to ensure that a 
product satisfies the customer (Thisse, 1998). 
The manual introduces and focuses on the five phases of quality planning and 
illustrates appropriate activities at each of these phases (Thisse, 1998): 
1. Planning and defining the program – How to determine customer 
needs and expectations in order to plan and define a quality program.  
E.g. Voice of the customer, design goals, preliminary process flow chart. 
2. Product design and development – Developing the design of a product 
or service and ensuring that it is feasible and will meet the customer’s 
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expectations. E.g. Design FMEA, Engineering drawings and 
specifications. 
3. Process design and development – Developing a manufacturing 
system and related control plans to achieve quality products. E.g. 
Process FMEA, process flow chart, Characteristic Matrix, measurement 
system analysis plan. 
4. Product and process validation – Validation of the manufacturing 
process through evaluation of the product trial run. Assessment of 
process capability and correction of any issues prior to full scale 
production. E.g. product trial run, preliminary Process Capability Study, 
production control plan. 
5. Feedback, assessment, and corrective action - Evaluation of all 
special and common cause variations and the effectiveness of the quality 
planning effort itself.  
 
Every organisation will be conducting some aspects of APQP, as virtually every 
program or activity has some planning associated with it. However, sometimes 
these efforts may not be recognised as such, and in smaller organisations the 
majority of the planning may be done informally (Thisse, 1998). Thisse (1998) 
emphasises that APQP is not a complex, added activity or ‘one more thing to 
do’. Rather, it should involve awareness that employees have developed their 
roles in the planning process and understand how those roles fit into the overall 
plan. 
2.1.2.3 Process Control Plans 
Process Control Plans are a major output of the quality planning process and 
are the basis of the supplier’s process control methodology (Thisse, 1998). The 
purpose of the Process Control Plan is to ensure that all process outputs will be 
in a state of control by providing process monitoring and control methods to 
control product and process characteristics (Hoyle, 1997). A Process Control 
Plan is a written description of a system for controlling parts and processes 
(Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, 1995) and is typically formatted as a table, 
as shown in Figure 2-1. It operates as an expansion of the current control 
column of the FMEA.  
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Figure 2-1 A typical Process Control Plan 
Not only is the Process Control Plan an effective summary of the special 
characteristics affected by the process, but it indicates whether the control 
strategy is prevention or detection orientated. A good Process Control Plan 
should reduce process tampering, provide a means for implementation of 
process improvement activities, describe training needs for standard operating 
procedures and document maintenance schedule requirements (Breyfogle, 
1999).  
Ultimately, the control plan should remain a ‘living document’ that reflects the 
current methods of control, and measurement systems used. Therefore, it 
should be updated as these methods and systems are evaluated and improved 
(Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, 1995). 
 
2.2 Key Process Terminology 
2.2.1 Reliability and Robustness 
Much like the term quality, ‘Reliability’ is a word that is frequently used, and 
although a conversational understanding is shared, a textbook definition is 
required. Drummer and Winton (1986) define reliability as the characteristic of 
an item expressed by the probability that it will perform a required function 
under stated conditions for a stated operating period. Clausing and Frey (2005) 
similarly define reliability as the proper functioning of the system under the full 
range of conditions experienced in the field, but go on to state that it requires 
two critical conditions; 
1. Mistake avoidance 
2. Robustness 
Process Step  / 
Function
Machine, Device, 
Jig, Tools for Mfg.
Characteristics Methods
Reaction Plan
Product Process
Product/
Process 
Specification/ 
Tolerance
Evaluation/
Measurement 
Technique
Sample
Control Method
Size Frequency
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Clausing and Frey (2005), further explain that by ‘mistake’ they refer to the 
array of design decisions and manufacturing operations that may result in a 
failure mode and by ‘robustness’ they refer to the ability of a system to function 
under the full range of conditions that may be experienced in the field. They go 
on to differentiate the challenges of developing a system in controlled, 
laboratory conditions and the broad set of real world environmental and 
operating conditions.   
2.2.2 Critical Product Characteristic 
Glodek et al. (2006) defines a critical product characteristic as a quantifiable 
property of an intermediate or final product that is considered critical for 
ensuring the final product quality. Such properties include dimensions, 
tolerances, finishes or assemblies which must be within a predetermined range.  
2.2.3 Critical Process Characteristic 
A critical process characteristic is a process input, be it intentional or otherwise, 
that, when varied beyond a limited range, has a direct and significant influence 
on a critical product characteristic (Glodek et al., 2006). Failure to stay within 
the limited range leads to a high likelihood of product failure. 
2.2.4 Noise Factors 
Variation in a product or a process is due to a variety of causes, known as noise 
factors (Phadke, 1989). Noise factors disrupt the ideal functioning of a product 
or process, and cause undesirable outputs, known as ‘error states’ (Ford 
Design Institute, 2004). These are parameters classified as either difficult or 
impossible for the process or product designer to control, or overly expensive to 
control. They are also referred to as sources of variation. Phadke (1989) 
describes three categories of noise factors for manufacturing processes; 
1. External to the process - in relation to the environment in which the 
process is carried out and the load offered to the process e.g. ambient 
temperature or variation in raw materials 
2. Process nonuniformity - variation in units that are processed in batches 
3. Process drift - due to deterioration of the process over time. As a result 
of tool wear for example 
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2.2.5 Control Factors 
These are parameters that can be specified freely by the designer (Phadke, 
1989), i.e. they can easily be controlled or altered in order to affect the output of 
process. For instance, drilling speed. 
 
2.3 Lean 
2.3.1 Defining Lean 
The idea of ‘lean thinking’ was first introduced by Womack, Jones and Roos 
(1990) to encapsulate the overriding philosophy behind the working practices of 
the Japanese vehicle manufacturers and the development of the Toyota 
Production System. Since then the term ‘Lean’ has become convoluted (Stone, 
2012) to the point where Hallam (2003) identifies that it has been used ‘to refer 
to four aspects of the manufacturing firm, namely the operating philosophy, the 
tools, the activities and the state of the manufacturer’. 
Stone (2012) simply describes the lean thinking paradigm as the differentiation 
between waste and value. ReVelle (2001) supports this definition, but involves 
the concept of the customer, basing Lean on the principle of eliminating waste 
and therefore adding value to the customer. This idea is consistent with 
Womack and Jones (1997) and their description that ‘Lean provides a way to do 
more and more with less, while coming closer and closer to providing customers 
with exactly what they want’. Borris (2012) concurs but provides clear distinction 
that value must be ‘defined from the perspective of the customer, not the 
manufacturer, but both parties gain from its application’. Rother and Shook 
(1999) make the association between Lean and a business’ processes in their 
definition that ‘Lean thinking in action is the continuous identification and 
elimination of waste from an organisation’s processes, leaving only value added 
activities.’  
From these definitions the following points can be concluded;  
 Lean concepts are dependent on the reduction of waste 
 Value is defined by the customer and can be specified 
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 Both waste and value are created by the organisation  
 The Lean journey is continuous and there is always room for 
improvements 
2.3.2 Lean Principles 
Womack and Jones (1997) identify five key principles in adopting the Lean 
philosophy;  
1. Specify value – Define value precisely from the perspective of the end 
customer in terms of the specific product with specific capabilities offered 
at a specific time. 
2. Value Stream – Identify the entire value stream for each product and 
eliminate waste. 
3. Flow – Make the remaining, value adding steps flow. 
4. Pull – Design and provide what the customer wants only when the 
customer wants it. 
5. Perfection – Strive for perfection continually by removing successive 
layers of waste as they are uncovered. Also to referred to as ‘Continuous 
Improvement’. 
2.3.3 Waste 
Waste is defined by Womack and Jones (1997) as any activity which absorbs 
resources but creates no value.  However, Melton (2005) suggests that 
sometimes waste does not add value to the customer but is a necessary part of 
the process and adds value to the company and thus cannot be eliminated, e.g. 
financial controls or research and development. In this respect, there is a case 
to say that not all value is directly experienced by the customer. Bicheno (2002) 
confronts this discussion by classifying activities as either value adding, non-
value adding, and non-value adding but temporarily necessary. The last two are 
considered as waste, but value adding activities may either be to do with the 
present or the future.  
Waste is recognised to occur in seven forms, known as the ‘seven deadly 
wastes’. First identified by Ohno (1998) and reported by Womack and Jones 
(1997), they are as follows; 
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1. Transportation – The unnecessary motion of movement of materials 
contributes towards non-value added time to the process and provides 
an opportunity for handling damage. 
2. Inventory – The entire inventory that is not directly required to fulfil 
customer orders. This requires handling and space and can require extra 
processing. 
3. Movement – The extra steps taken by employees and equipment as a 
result of inefficient layout, defects or excess inventory.  
4. Waiting – Periods of inactivity in a downstream process because an 
upstream activity has not delivered on time, possibly as a result of 
bottlenecking or machine breakdown. 
5. Over Production - When operations continue after they should have 
stopped resulting in excess products and increased inventory. 
6. Over Processing – Additional work such as rework, handling, 
reprocessing or storage as a result of defects, over production or excess 
inventory. 
7. Defects – Finished goods that do not conform to the specification or 
customer’s expectation, thus causing scrap and rework if detected or 
customer dissatisfaction if not.  
 
Various authors have extended Ohno’s original list. Bicheno (2002) states that 
Womack and Jones suggest an additional waste associated with making the 
wrong product correctly. This relates to their first principle of lean thinking, 
‘Value’, and that it “begins with the ultimate customer”. Today this is also the 
starting point of ISO 9001:2000 (Bicheno, 2002). Hicks (2007) also credits 
Womack and Jones with identifying a separate ‘eighth’ category, regarding the 
underutilisation of people and their ideas (Bicheno (2002) also identifies this 
waste but attributes it to Ohno). Hicks (2007), however, does not recognise this 
waste in his research stating that it is arguably inherent in the original seven 
wastes. Furthermore, Koskela (2004) argues that starting processing before all 
of the materials for production have arrived, which he dubs ‘making do’, should 
be added to the list.   
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The seven wastes are productivity rather than quality related, but these two are 
closely linked. Improved productivity leads to leaner operations which make 
quality issues more visible and improved quality leads to improved productivity 
by removing wasteful practices such as rework, extra inspection and the 
activities associated with completing operations for a second time (Bicheno, 
2002). Shingo (1989) summarises this in his reflection that “In the past the 
typical approach to process improvement was to ‘improve the waste’. Instead, 
fundamental improvements must be made because they eliminate the waste 
itself and thus the need to ‘improve’ it”. 
2.3.4 Lean Tools 
A variety of tools and techniques including Kaizen, Kanban, Single Minute 
Exchange of Dies (SMED), 5S, Total Productive Maintenance (TPM), Value 
Stream Mapping (VSM), Total Quality Management (TQM) and many more 
support the lean transformation in order to remove waste, variability and 
overburden and deliver improvement in specific areas (Neha et al, 2013). Lean 
transformations employ a variety of techniques and tools but it is the 
fundamental understanding of waste and its removal that is critical to a 
successful adoption of lean (Hicks, 2007). 
2.3.5 Application of Lean 
The concept of Lean is validated by its diverse and popular uptake across a 
variety of industries. Although the ideas and techniques were developed in 
manufacturing, they have spread into a whole host of other business 
applications. The Lean Enterprise Research Centre (LERC) (2007) provides an 
insight into the opportunities that are available in manufacturing alone, stating 
that for most production operations only 5% of activities add value, 35% are 
necessary non-value activities and 60% add no value at all.  
Within the automotive industry, the Toyota Production System (Monden, 1998) 
(Shingo, 1986) provides a comprehensive example. Crute et al., (2003) provide 
an insight into the applications of Lean in the aerospace industry, comparing the 
challenges experienced by two different sites of a third tier aerospace company 
pursuing Lean practices as a result of pressures from their customers within the 
industry. Furthermore, Dudley (2005) describes studies of the implementation of 
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Lean in a medium sized aerospace manufacturer and, in terms of large 
manufacturers, Lu (2002) and Chang, Huang and Torng, (2013) refer to the 
adoption of lean practices within Boeing during the introduction of a moving 
assembly line. Within military aerospace manufacture, Lockheed Martin have 
applied Lean techniques to the manufacture of F-16, F-22 and C-130J (Crute et 
al., 2003) (Chang, Huang and Torng, 2013). Aside from the aerospace and 
automotive industries Maia, Alves and Leao (2013) have conducted case 
studies into textile and clothing manufacture and Pheng and Fang (2005) 
describe applications in the construction industry. Outside of manufacturing 
altogether, Hicks (2007) investigates the application of Lean towards 
information management.  
2.3.6 Shortcomings of Lean 
Despite such widespread use and familiarity, the literature identifies a number 
of potential issues associated with the Lean approach. Although the principles 
and tools associated with lean thinking may appear to be easy to apply they 
present huge challenges associated with change, with cultural change being the 
hardest to implement for any business that truly intends to become lean 
(Melton, 2005). Further to this point, Seddon and Caulkin (2007) state that 
companies that use only the Lean tools but fail to embrace the underlying 
philosophy are unlikely to gain more than limited and temporary results. Hallam 
(2003) believes these issues are associated with the fact that people attempting 
to adopt these techniques do not know what they are trying to achieve. 
Although there are many tools and techniques there is not an overarching 
methodology for the application of Lean in a business setting, in terms of a step 
by step procedure that details how and when each of its tools are applied.  
 
2.4 Error Proofing 
A Poka-Yoke is a technique for avoiding simple human error at work (Shimbun, 
1988). The term was first used by Japanese engineer Shigeo Shingo, and 
literally translates to ‘mistake proofing’. Shingo (1986) distinguishes between 
‘mistakes’ (which are inevitable) and ‘defects’ (which result when a mistake 
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reaches a customer), and describes the aim of Poka-Yoke is to design devices 
which prevent mistakes becoming defects. 
Shingo saw Poka-Yoke’s as a means to move from ‘judgement inspection’, in 
which final inspection is used to distinguish between defective and non-
defective products, to ‘informative inspection’, when processing is informed of 
whenever a defect is discovered so that it can be prevented from reoccurring, or 
‘source inspection’ where defects are prevented by controlling the conditions 
that influence quality at their source. In essence, judgement inspections 
discover defects, while informative and source inspections reduce them 
(Shingo, 1989). 
There are two types of Poka-Yoke – control and warning (Shingo, 1989). The 
former shuts down the production line in the event of a Poka-Yoke device being 
activated, whilst the latter alerts the worker when a defect has occurred. The 
choice between which type is implemented is influenced by the likely frequency 
of defects and the costs associated with their occurrence. 
Casey (2009) provides clarity on the differences that make a Poka-Yoke a 
‘mistake proofing’ device or an ‘error proofing’ device. A Poka-Yoke which 
prevents the operator from starting the value adding part of the function is an 
‘error proofing’ device, as it is preventing bad product creation, whereas a Poka-
Yoke that that is used to perform part inspection after the value added activity is 
a ‘mistake proofing’ device; the latter being consistent with Shingo’s definition 
given above. In this sense, it is the position of Poka-Yoke device in relation to 
the value adding activity that determines its polarity.  
Casey (2009) makes the case that error proofing devices are preferential 
because although mistake proofing devices prevent the continuation of the 
faulty production through the process, they are still reactive, whereas error 
proofing devices prevent the manufacture of defective parts in the first instance, 
removing the costs associated with handling the substandard products. 
Furthermore, he identifies three areas where error proofing must be focussed; 
 Value added actions, such as the work of operators in assembly or 
manufacturing tasks 
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 Job set up elements, such as the alignment of tools and fixtures, or when 
kitting an area with components 
 Processing parameters, such as critical process settings, which include 
temperatures, pressures, speeds, feeds or other parameters that govern 
the success of the process 
 
Casey (2009) also states that consequently the best error proofing devices; 
 Work constantly 
 Are built into the natural flow of the operators 
 Are simple and inexpensive 
 Need only natural properties to function e.g. gravity 
One drawback of using Poka-Yoke devices is that potentially valuable 
information about process variance may be lost, thereby inhibiting process 
improvement. 
 
2.5 Systems Engineering & Process Modelling 
2.5.1 Systems Engineering 
A system is broadly defined as a set of interrelated components working 
together toward some common objective (Kossiakoff et al., 2011). This 
definition can encompass a myriad of examples from a weather satellite to a 
household guttering system, which demonstrates that systems exist at hugely 
differing levels of complexity and scale.  
A manufacturing system is a typical input-output system which produces 
outputs through activities of transformation from inputs (Wu, 1994). The 
‘common objective’ in this case is the output of the process, which is a 
component or product that conforms to the requirements set by its design, and 
the ‘interrelated components’ refer to the machinery, staff, supply chain and so 
forth that bring around the transformation.  
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2.5.1.1 Functional Analysis 
Functional analysis can be seen to provide the backbone of systems 
engineering design (Campean et al., 2011). Functions are analysed by 
decomposing higher-level functions, into lower-level functions which results in a 
description of the system in terms of what it does logically and the performance 
required from it (Department of Defense, 2001). Deconstructing functions in this 
way creates a hierarchy that terminates at a level where the function can be 
achieved by hardware.   
2.5.1.1.1 Axiomatic Design 
Axiomatic design provides a standard conceptual framework to map system 
requirements through a series of ‘domains’. These domains are, in hierarchical 
order, the Customer domain, the Functional domain, the Physical domain and 
the Process domain. There are functional hierarchies within each of these 
domains, created through iterative ‘zigzagging’ between adjacent domains, 
which define requirements at different levels within the system. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 2-2, adapted from Suh (1995), with a description of the 
characteristics represented by each of the domains for manufacturing.  
 
 
Figure 2-2 Domains and Functional Hierarchies in Axiomatic Design (El-Haik, 2005) 
Customer Domain
Attributes which 
consumers desire
Functional Domain
Functional requirements 
specified for the product
Physical Domain
Physical variables which 
can satisfy the functional 
requirements
Process Domain
Process variables that 
can control design 
parameters
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2.5.1.1.2 Functional Flow Block Diagrams 
Functional flow block diagrams are also used to describe system requirements 
in functional terms. These are flow diagrams that link together a number of 
function blocks to show how they are sequenced in a system.  A function block 
is a representation of a function that a particular collection of engineering 
systems and/or human actions are supposed to perform. The basic elements of 
a function block are the inputs, the internal states and the outputs (Papazoglou, 
1998).  
 
Figure 2-3 Simple Block Diagram 
 
The Department of Defense (2001) provide the following guidelines for 
completing function flow block diagrams; 
 Each functional block needs to stand for a definite, finite, discrete action 
 Each level should have a consistent numbering format 
 Lines connecting functions should indicate function flow and not a lapse 
in time 
 Diagrams should be laid out so that the flow direction is generally from 
left to right 
 
Figure 2-4 demonstrates how these functional block diagrams can be 
deconstructed to provide clarity. Wu (1994) recommends that each level has 
between three and six functions. 
 
Figure 2-4 Decomposition through Functional Block Diagrams 
Input OutputInternal states
1 2 3 4 5
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.2.5 2.2.6
Level One
Level Two
Level Three
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When analysing complex systems, great care needs to be taken to select the 
appropriate level of detail for analysis. Failure to do so can result in isolation of 
one sub system from another, leading to an incomplete or distorted view of the 
systems behaviour (Bartolomei et al., 2012).  
2.5.2 Process Mapping 
Process Mapping consists of constructing a model that shows the relationships 
between the activities, people, data and objects involved in the production of a 
specified output (Biazzo, 2002). It is a popular method of visually representing a 
process in terms of its inputs, outputs and key activities. Consequently, the 
transformation of products within a process can be understood.  
Process Mapping is used effectively to formally document and evaluate 
processes in order to reduce cycle time, reduce defects, improve consistency of 
operators, reduce new operator training time, reduce product variability and 
reduce hidden factory reworks (Breyfogle, 1999). Process Maps should be used 
to identify improvements and to locate significant or critical product and process 
characteristics, which allows them to be addressed in subsequent control plans 
(Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, 1995).  
Despite widespread use, there are some potential pitfalls of Process Mapping 
and modelling recorded in the literature; 
1. Process Mapping often results in differences between what is recorded 
and what actually occurs in reality (Bicheno, 2002).  
2. Large amounts of time can be dedicated to creating Process Maps that 
are never used (Breyfogle, 1999) 
3. Teams can get lost chasing ‘Syntactical correctness’ (Rosemann, 2006b) 
and spend overly long trying to create the perfect Process Map and may 
go beyond the true representation of the process (Pang, 2011).  
4. Teams can have difficulty with complex processes which results in 
attempts to make overly detailed models (Rosemann, 2006b). 
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Mendling et al. (2008) provide some guidelines when producing process 
models. A ‘Verb-Object’ format should be used to describe operations as these 
are more easily understood. It is recommended that using as few ‘elements’ 
(operations) as possible and having only one start and one end point is 
beneficial as this simplifies the process. Furthermore, it is advisable to 
decompose the model if it becomes too large. 
2.5.3 Cause and Effect Relationships 
The Cause and Effect diagram was developed by Kaoru Ishikawa in 1943 and 
helps identify and document the causes and sub causes of a specific problem 
or effect (Clark, 2000). The tool is used to identify relationships between the 
effect and all the possible causes influencing it (Chrysler, Ford and General 
Motors, 1995). 
Schippers (1999) provides a number of disadvantages of this tool when used to 
analyse processes; 
1. The tool has to be continually redrawn when analysing multiple product 
characteristics. This is time consuming and does not facilitate the 
identification of interrelationships. 
2. When the same cause affects more than one product characteristic it has 
to be written down on each diagram. 
3. Cause and effect diagrams are difficult and inefficient when used in 
electronic form.  
 
Consequently, Schippers (1999) has developed an alternative, which he refers 
to as a Process Matrix.  This tool uses a matrix structure, which is popular in 
tools such as the ‘The House of Quality’ applied in Quality Function Deployment 
(Hauser and Clausing, 1988). The Process Matrix lists product characteristics 
along the top of the matrix and process factors across the side. Relationships 
between the characteristics and the factors are then recorded in the 
corresponding cells. This use of a matrix format is advantageous as it is easy to 
complete, efficient in space and has a clear structure. Furthermore, it is possible 
to add extra modules with ease and it can be drawn using standard software. 
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A similar structure is used for a Characteristics Matrix. A Characteristic Matrix 
provides a clear and simple description of the production process and the effect 
that successive operations have on the product (Carrión et al., 2007). Using a 
matrix structure applies the same benefits realised through the Process Matrix, 
but identifies relationships between product characteristics to process 
operations rather than process factors (Ford Design Institute, 2004). The 
Characteristic Matrix uses a key, or legend, of symbols to denote the nature of 
the relationships between the product and the process. 
 
Figure 2-5 Simple Example of a Characteristics Matrix 
 
 
2.6 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been applied in an extensive 
range of industries (Liu et al., 2011) as a proactive tool to assess and improve 
the reliability of products and processes by discovering and correcting design 
deficiencies through the analysis of potential failure modes, effects, and 
mechanisms, followed by a recommendation of corrective action (Yang, 2007). 
FMEAs aim to define, identify, prioritise, and eliminate known or potential 
failures at an early a stage as possible (Bicheno, 2002).  
2.6.1 Failure Modes 
Kara-Zaitri, Keller, Barody and Fleming (1991) concisely define a failure mode 
as ‘any manner in which an item can fail’. In this definition the term item is used 
to describe a component, subsystem or system in terms of a product or a 
process. Kmenta and Ishii (1998) refer to dependencies within systems in their 
definition, by describing a failure mode as essentially an undesired cause-effect 
chain of events. Braunwart (2007) describes failure modes in to two main 
Operations
Product Characteristics 10 20 30
Hole Drilled X A
Hole Tapped X A
Screws Added X
Key
X – Characteristic created or changed
A – Characteristic has an effect on another  
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groups – hard failures, where the item breaks or ceases to function and soft 
failures where the item continues to function but at less than ideal performance. 
Within these two categories there are four different types of failure mode (Ford 
Design Institute, 2004): 
 Hard Failure Modes: 
1. No Function – System or design is totally non-functional or 
inoperative.  
 Soft Failure Modes: 
2. Partial/Over Function/Degraded over Time – Degraded 
performance. Meets some of the function requirements, but does not 
fully comply with all attributes or characteristics. 
3. Intermittent Function – Complies but loses some functionality or 
becomes inoperative often due to external factors such as 
temperature, moisture, environment, etc. In effect, the 
starts/stops/starts again series of events. 
4. Unintended Function – This means that the interaction of several 
elements whose independent performance is correct adversely 
affects the product or the process. This will result in an unwanted 
outcome or consequence. 
2.6.2 Types of FMEA  
There are typically regarded to be four types of FMEA recognised by the 
literature (Stamatis (2005), Bicheno (2002), Yang (2007))  that can either be 
used in sequence, to form a hierarchy, or independently. A System FMEA is 
used at the design stage to analyse overall systems including the interactions 
between functions so as to minimise failure effects. A Design FMEA is used to 
minimise design faults before they are passed to manufacturing. The Process 
FMEA focuses on failures caused in the manufacturing process and should be 
applied during the development of all new processes and when modifying 
existing processes (McAndrew and O’Sullivan, 1994). Finally, the Service 
FMEA focuses on service failures.   
The Ford Design Institute (2004) also recognise a Concept FMEA used to 
determine potential failures in the concept phases of designs and processes 
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and therefore aid in the selection of a winning concept. The Ford Motor 
Company (1996) provides training resources for Machinery FMEAs for assist in 
evaluating the reliability, robustness and safety of equipment during its design 
phase. However, this could be argued to be largely similar to a Design FMEA in 
principle. 
Regardless of form, all FMEAs use a similar procedure and analysis sheet, as 
shown in Figure 2-6. 
 
Figure 2-6 Typical FMEA document, in this case a Design FMEA (Quality One, 2012) 
 
2.6.3 Risk Priority Number 
The assessment of risk is one of the most important aspects of the FMEA 
process. The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is used as a measure of the relative 
risk of each failure, and is calculated by the product of three individual risk 
assessment criteria, Severity (S), Occurrence (O) and Detection (D), which are 
typically rated on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the most favourable and 10 is 
the most critical case.  
Severity is an assessment of the level of impact of a failure on the customer, 
Occurrence is how often the cause of the failure may occur and Detection is an 
assessment of how well the product or process controls detect the cause of 
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failure or the failure mode has occurred. The detection assessment is also used 
to measure the effectiveness of current controls to prevent the occurrence. 
Consequently, RPN values range from 1 to 1000. These are used to prioritise 
action and resource against specific failure modes.  
2.6.4 Application of FMEA 
Stamatis (2005) states that FMEA must begin as early as possible, as soon as 
some information is known, in order to maximised effectiveness as FMEA is one 
of the most important early preventative actions. Ford (1995) supports this idea, 
suggesting that timeliness is one of the most important success factors in FMEA 
implementation and that it is a ‘before the event’ rather than ‘after the fact’ 
exercise.  
FMEAs must be completed by a team as the exercise should be a catalyst to 
stimulate the interchange of ideas between the functions affected. All of the 
team members should have some knowledge of the task at hand, the problem 
to be discussed, and direct or indirect ownership of the problem (Stamatis, 
2005).  
2.6.5 Advanced FMEA 
Kmenta et al., (1999) developed an Advanced Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (AFMEA) as a methodology to analyse manufacturing process 
capability, which aimed to improve product quality, process efficiency and time 
to market. This method was originally developed by Eubanks et al., (1996) to 
enhance reliability at the early stages of conceptual design. 
AFMEA uses a behavioural model that defines relationships between; 
 functions 
 states: preconditions (“what is required”) and post conditions (“what is 
expected”) of each function 
 elements: physical entities that enable functions to achieve the desired 
post-conditions 
 
Figure 2-7 shows the methodology for applying AFMEA, which begins with 
building a model to represent the manufacturing process as a causal sequence 
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of functions and states and is then utilised to identify and understand areas for 
improvement by inserting failures, simulating the effects and assessing the 
causes.   
 
Figure 2-7 Flowchart for Advanced FMEA (Kmenta et al., 1999) 
 
Through a workshop analysing an ultrasonic inspection process for titanium 
disks, Kmenta et al., (1999) compared the outputs of a free brainstorming 
approach with those of a version of structured AFMEA. Their findings showed 
that the structured AFMEA approach found a far higher number of process 
problems (119 to 32) and discussed that this method could be useful where a 
specific problem or error is unknown. Furthermore, this result was achieved with 
a facilitator that had less knowledge of the process than the brainstorming 
approach, from which they concluded that structured AFMEA was transferrable 
to other manufacturing processes and did not rely on process-specific expertise. 
However, it was also found that the AFMEA group tended to neglect the 
specifics of some failures, such as mechanical problems, as a result of the 
rigour of the method which limited the team’s thinking to items closely related to 
the process model. Collected responses from the participants indicated that the 
AFMEA was advantageous in that it had a clear structure, logical approach and 
Sequence the 
behaviours
Insert failure state
Propagate effects Assess causes
Compile cause-effect scenarios
Rank likelihood Rank severity
Calculate risk priority number
Propose solutions
Define system
List system inputs/outputs
Decompose into sub-functions
List inputs/outputs of sub-functions
Define 
dependencies
Map sub-functions to 
elements
Refine model?
Building the Behaviour Model Analysing the Model
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an element of completeness, but disadvantageous due to its broad scope that 
limited depth and lack of accommodation for “off-the-wall” thinking (Kmenta et 
al., 1999). However, these studies have not covered corrective action that 
results from the identification of the failure modes and how this would be 
structured. 
2.6.6 Shortcomings of FMEA 
Despite a widespread application, particularly in the aerospace, nuclear and 
automotive industries, and well a defined methodology (Automotive Industry 
Action Group (2008), SAE J1937 (2009), Ford Motor Company (2004)) there 
are many reported shortcomings with FMEA; 
 FMEAs are highly labour intensive and there is a tendency to produce 
large, cumbersome documents (Bell et al., 1992) 
 FMEAs are perceived as a difficult, laborious and ‘boring’ technique 
(Kara-Zaitri, Keller, Barody and Fleming, 1991) 
 The time scale required to complete the analysis often exceeds the 
design and development stage (Hawkins and Woollons, 1995) 
 FMEAs are not used to affect design decisions as failure causes are not 
often defined (McKinney, 1991) 
 FMEAs are often seen to be ‘just more paperwork’ and as a result no 
benefit is expected from them (Johnson and Khan, 2003).  
 Without an organized approach to identifying failure modes, the analysis 
can become subjective based on experience level of the engineers 
(Kmenta and Ishii, 1998) 
 After the initial high severity risks have been avoided, or the ‘critical few’ 
as Casey (2009) describes them, there is an issue of scope, where the 
abundance of lower risk failures become so large that that FMEAs no 
longer provide an effective prioritisation. Casey (2009) refers to this as 
ever increasing opportunity.  
 The validity of RPN as a method of prioritization is questionable. The 
three risk factors are difficult to be precisely evaluated, the relatively 
importance of S, O and D are not taken into consideration and different 
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combinations can render the same RPN whilst the hidden risk 
implications can be totally different. (Liu et al, 2013) 
2.7 Failure Mode Avoidance 
Inspired by Clausing’s (2004) pragmatic definition “reliability is failure mode 
avoidance”, Failure Mode Avoidance (FMA) promotes a strategic focus on early 
identification of potential failure modes and development of robust 
countermeasures. The FMA framework discussed by Campean et al., (2013) 
offers a consistent approach for systems engineering design analysis, 
facilitating early discovery of failure modes through the use of a structured 
sequence of proven engineering tools that are built around a central FMEA. In 
essence, the philosophy is that identifying potential failures early, when the 
opportunity for change is greatest and the cost is lowest, is ultimately a matter 
of common sense engineering complimented with a structured framework and a 
proven toolset (Campean and Henshall, 2009).  
2.7.1 The Failure Mode Avoidance Process 
The FMA framework consists of four higher level process steps, as illustrated in 
Table 1, each with a clear objective and supported by existing engineering 
tools.  
The FMA process is based on the premise that in order to identify the manner in 
which a system can potentially fail to function it is necessary first to understand 
how the system functions (Campean and Henshall, 2009), which is achieved in 
the first step. Once the potential function failure modes have been identified 
then the effects and causes of failure can understood in second step. The third 
step determines the cause of the failure mode. Finally, when all the mechanics 
of each failure mode is understood fully, robust countermeasures can be 
developed and implemented. 
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Table 1 FMA Process Steps and Engineering Tools 
 
2.7.1.1 Step 1 
In order to develop a thorough understanding of the functioning of a system, 
FMA employs a series of synergistic tools.  A System State Flow Diagram 
(SSFD) is used to provide a comprehensive function based decomposition by 
mapping the flows of energy, material and information through the system 
(Campean et al., 2013). SSFD provides an identification of discrete states of 
energy within the system, identification of the functions required from the 
system to transition between these states, and identification of the design 
elements that would deliver these functions. The functions that have to be 
achieved by the system in order to satisfy this energy flow are then mapped 
onto the SSFD, decomposing into a functional hierarchy to a level that can be 
achieved by hardware. This allows a function tree to be developed.   
With these factors identified the system is defined using a Boundary Diagram. 
Defining the boundary of a system is the process of identifying the signals to the 
system, the outputs from the system and the noise sources that disturb the 
system (Ford Design Institute, 2004) (Yang, 2005). FMA uses the Boundary 
Diagram to identify the internal and external interfaces (noise factors) and other 
systems that interact with the main systems function. Exchange at interfaces is 
FMA Process Step Engineering Tools
1.Understand how the 
system functions
Boundary Diagram
Interface Matrix
System State Flow Diagram
Function Tree
2. Identify how the system 
fails to function and the 
effect of failure
FMEA
3. Determine the cause of 
failure
Function Fault Tree
P – Diagram
4. Develop and verify 
countermeasures to failure
Robustness Worksheet
Design Verification 
Worksheet
Design Verification Plan
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important because they can influence the delivery of the main function of the 
system (Campean et al., 2013).  
The Interface Analysis Table (IAT), developed from the Interface Matrix and 
Design Structure Matrix (DSM) used in industry (Webb, 2002) (Browning, 2005), 
is used to document the nature of the exchange at the interface, a functional 
requirement for managing the exchange at the interface and an evaluation of 
the effect of the interface on the main function of the system (Campean and 
Henshall, 2013).  
2.7.1.2 Step 2 
With a rich understanding of the functioning of the system, function failure 
modes are systematically identified using an FMEA. As a document, the FMEA 
is typical of those described in Section 2.8, but the difference is that it is 
populated by the information contained in the preceding FMA documents. For 
example, interface functions, documented in the IAT, provide the possible root 
causes of a function failure mode recognising that failure to manage an 
interface function is likely to cause a system failure (Campean et al., 2013). 
2.7.1.3 Step 3 
In FMA, the FMEA is also supported by P – Diagrams and Function Fault Tree 
Analysis. A P – Diagram is useful to understand a particular subsystem and 
how noise factors can create error states (Johannesson et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 2-8 P Diagram 
As much of the information on the P - Diagram is previously identified, 
particularly on the Boundary Diagram, it is relatively straightforward to generate 
but is powerful in bringing together factors that potentially have a beneficial or 
System, assembly or 
component
Signal
(Input)
Noise
Control 
factors
Error 
states
Response
(Output)
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detrimental effect on the system, and in a clear graphical form (Campean and 
Henshall, 2009). The P – Diagram is particularly useful in identifying failure 
modes that are caused by variability, and that are associated with a lack of 
robustness in the system (Campean et al., 2013).  
The causes of failures are also identified using a Function Fault Tree. A fault 
tree is a graphical representation of the logical relationship between a system 
failure and a hierarchy of events (Campean and Henshall, 2008). In FMA it is 
created as a mirror image of the function tree and is used to map how potential 
failures can occur in the system and what their effects are. Once this is known, 
this information can be fed into the FMEA under ‘Potential Causes of Failure’ 
and a score representing how likely these are to occur can be given. 
2.7.1.4 Step 4 
With the potential failure modes identified and their causes analysed, robust 
countermeasures can be designed and verified to prevent their occurrence 
through noise factor management. The noise factors are prioritised by 
assessing their severity and likelihood of occurrence, as well as the current 
state of knowledge of the noise factor effects (Campean and Henshall, 2009).  
Populated with information from the P – Diagram, a Robustness Worksheet is 
used to categorically assess the options for addressing each of the noise 
factors. These range from doing nothing, if it is decided that the existing design 
is good enough to avoid failure, to implementing a design change where there is 
doubt that the current design is adequate.  
If countermeasures are required, established and implemented these need to 
be verified and proven effective (Campean and Henshall, 2009). The noise 
factor that is being addressed by the countermeasure needs to be included in 
any verification study in order to prove that they are effective. A Design 
Verification Plan is then used to manage these studies, detailing which tests are 
to be conducted and the acceptance criteria.  
As with the other steps in the FMA process, the FMEA plays a central role in 
this step by managing the overall process (Campean and Henshall, 2009). The  
information on countermeasure development is documented on the FMEA 
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either under ‘Current Controls’ when the countermeasure is pre-existing, a 
similar design or when it has been deemed that ‘doing nothing’ is a suitable 
action, or under ‘Recommended Actions’ when the implantation of a developed 
countermeasure is required.  
2.7.2  Strengths and Weaknesses  
The FMA paradigm has been proven effective in industrial case studies 
(Campean et al., 2011, Campean et al., 2013) and has had a strong uptake in 
the automotive industry as a strategy for enhancing effectiveness of the product 
development process. 
Campean and Henshall (2012) provide feedback from teams in a number of 
their publications, in which they have implemented the FMA approach in 
industry case studies. This feedback highlights the following positive aspects; 
 The structured approach to the process removes the reliance on 
brainstorming and delivers a more objective, impartial and 
comprehensive analysis  
 The approach is portable and can be applied across multiple domains 
 The strong integration of the process through the information flow 
between the tools 
 The FMEA was more straightforward to complete 
 FMA provided a strong framework for gathering comprehensive 
knowledge about the system being designed 
 
Teams still found that following the FMA approach was still an expensive 
activity and was not without its own challenges. Some teams found that 
maintaining an adequate level of resolution for the analysis was difficult, as a 
result of team members from different engineering backgrounds contributing 
different levels of understanding of the problem. However, it was found that 
through the functional analysis a consistent level of resolution was achieved 
(Campean et al., 2011).  
Campean et al. (2011) also state that the Interface Analysis was perceived as 
being challenging and time consuming, as it was tackled by a team with no prior 
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experience to the tool. However, the team were still able to identify potential 
exchanges at interfaces and recognised that without the full functional analysis 
some of these would have been overlooked. The time spent on developing the 
interface analysis is redeemed later in the product development process as late 
engineering changes and their associated costs are mitigated (Campean and 
Henshall, 2013). 
Although the FMEA was more straightforward to complete, it still required 
significant effort from the team in regards to the supporting tools. However, it 
was felt that this effort was worthwhile, providing the structure in terms of setting 
requirements for components, developing countermeasures and so forth, and 
as a result it was perceived as an effective way for managing failure modes and 
not as ‘just another thing to do’ (Campean et al., 2011).  
The FMA approach requires a shift in resource allocation from failure resolution 
upstream towards failure avoidance, which is a large challenge to overcome in 
engineering organisations. A fundamental aspect of this challenge is associated 
with cultural norms of reactive action or ‘firefighting’ (Campean and Henshall, 
2013). 
 
2.8 Statistical Quality Improvement Methods 
2.8.1 Six Sigma 
Six Sigma is a quality approach that originated in Motorola in 1987 who called 
their approach ‘Six Sigma’ when winning the 1998 Baldridge Award (Bicheno, 
2002). Its strategy involves the use of statistical tools within a structured 
methodology (Breyfogle, 1999) in order to reduce variation in processes and 
services. Schroeder et al., (2008) discuss the various disparities in the 
definitions of Six Sigma, from both an academic and practitioner perspective.   
In statistics, the Greek letter ‘σ’ (Sigma) refers to the standard deviation; a 
measure used to quantify the amount of variation within a set of data. 
Simplistically, it refers to the average difference between a sample of data and 
its mean. Six Sigma aims to develop processes that are stable to such a degree 
that the required upper and lower specification limits are six standard deviations 
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from the mean output. In relation to the standard normal distribution this 
equates to 3.4 defective parts per million and demonstrates a highly capable 
process. To this end, the fundamental principle of Six Sigma is to take an 
organisation to an improved level of Sigma capability through the rigorous 
application of statistical tools and techniques (Antony et al., 2003). 
2.8.1.1 Methodology 
DMAIC, an acronym that stands for Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and 
Control, is a structured improvement procedure used by Six Sigma (De Mast 
and Lokkerbol, 2012), where each of the letters correspond to a phase. De 
Koning and De Mast (2006) state that most accounts of the Six Sigma 
methodology agree on this phase structure, but descriptions of the steps they 
comprise of and the tools they implement diverge. Consequently, through a 
thorough study of reputable sources, including Breyfogle (1999), Harry (1997) 
and Hahn et al., (2000), they have produced a consistent rationalised 
construction of the Six Sigma methodology, shown in Table 2 as reproduced by 
De Koning and De Mast (2006) where ‘CTQ’ refers to a process’s Critical-to-
Quality characteristics and ‘X’  refers to a causal influence factor. 
Phase Generic Objective 
Define 
Problem selection and benefit analysis 
D1 Identify and map relevant processes 
D2 Identify stakeholders 
D3 Determine and prioritize customer needs and requirements 
D4 Make a business case for the project 
Measure 
Translation of the problem into a measureable form, and measurement of the current situation 
M1 Select one or more CTQs 
M2 Determine operational definitions of CTQs and requirements 
M3 Validate measurement systems of the CTQs 
M4 Assess the current process capability 
M5 Define objectives 
Analyse 
Identification of influence factors and causes that determine the CTQs behaviour 
A1 Identify potential influence factors 
A2 Select the vital few influence factors 
Improve 
Design and implementation of adjustments to the process to improve the performance of the CTQs 
I1 Quantify relationships between Xs and CTQs 
I2 Design actions to modify the process or settings of influence factors so that CTQs are optimised 
I3 Conduct pilot test of improvement actions 
Control 
Empirical verification of the project’s results and adjustment of the process management and control 
system in order that improvements are sustainable  
C1 Determine the new process capability 
C2 Implement control plans 
Table 2 Six Sigma Methodology 
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2.8.1.2 Applications of Six Sigma 
Despite, being described as a ‘full-on company fad’ by some critics (Clifford, 
2001), Six Sigma’s potential is demonstrated through successful applications in 
manufacturing organisations such as Motorola, Raytheon, General Electric, 
Honeywell, Johnson and Johnson and Texas Instruments who report cost 
savings and increased efficiency (Kwak and Anbari, 2006).  
Strengths of Six Sigma include (Antony, 2006); 
 Clear focus on achieving measureable and quantifiable financial returns 
 Emphasis on  the importance of data and decision making rather than 
assumptions 
 Dedicated tool set, each with a how, why and when  
2.8.1.3 Limitations of Six Sigma and DMAIC 
Breyfogle (1999) describes that Six Sigma implementation can either be the 
best thing that happens to a company or it can be found to be a dismal failure 
and that it all depends on the implementation. According to Antony (2004), the 
right selection and prioritisation of projects is one of the critical success factors 
of a Six Sigma program, but this tends to be based on pure subjective 
judgement. This is especially the case when quality data is unavailable at the 
start of a project. Nonthaleerak and Hendry (2008), found that project selection 
is usually based on over emphasis of financial savings criteria, conducted in the 
Define phase. This had a negative impact on the overall project length as an 
overly long time was dedicated to this phase. Furthermore, Chakravorty (2009) 
finds that the DMAIC process proceeded more effectively when the problem 
was easily and clearly defined, as opposed to proceeding irrationally when not 
clearly defined early in the process. This resulted in speculation of root causes 
and proposed solutions through ‘trial and error’ without solid justification.  
In regards to the Control phase, it was found that difficulties are encountered in 
setting up effective means to sustain improvement results at the end of a project 
and that large organisations that demonstrate success in this area ‘all have a 
good foundation in a quality system’ such as ISO9000 which ensures control 
plans are in use and maintained effectively. Nonthaleerak and Hendry (2008) 
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conclude that having a foundation in a quality system is advantageous when 
adopting Six Sigma. Anthony (2004) alludes to frustration experienced as the 
solutions driven by the data are expensive and only a small part of the solution 
is implemented at the end.   
2.8.2 Statistical Process Control 
Statistical Process Control (SPC) refers to the use of statistical based 
techniques for the control of a process that transforms inputs into outputs 
(Oakland, 2003). SPC aims at achieving good quality in manufacture through 
prevention rather than detection, by controlling the process, or the machine, 
which makes the product. The principle is that if the process is good, then the 
outputs will automatically be good (Bicheno, 2002). Alternatively, if the process 
goes out of control, it can be stopped before any further defects are made. 
SPC uses a number of different tools to identify and prioritise relationships, 
such as Pareto analysis, tally charts, histograms and scatter diagrams, but 
Control Charts are the most prevalent method of monitoring process 
performance (Oakland, 2003).  
2.8.2.1 Control Charts 
Control Charts are used to study how a process changes over time and to 
determine if that process is in a state of statistical control (Tague, 2005). The 
main Control Charts are the ‘X bar and R chart’, which are used to monitor the 
mean and range of the sample taken (Bicheno, 2002). A characteristic of the 
process that is related to the quality of the product is selected and measured 
according to a Data Collection Plan. These measurements are used to calculate 
the mean and the range of the data set, which are subsequently plotted on a 
line graph. Based on the data sampling frequency and sample size upper and 
lower control limits are set that determine when a process is out of statistical 
control and intervention is required (Oakland, 2003). Furthermore, the data can 
be analysed to identify instability in the process by evaluating abnormal 
distribution patterns (Asaka, and Ozeki, 1990). 
 Sequence - More than seven data points on one side of the centre line 
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 Bias – More data points on one side of the line, but less than seven 
consecutively 
 Trend – A steady rise or fall of seven of more consecutive data points 
 Approaching the limit – Two of three consecutive data points near the 
control limit  
 Periodicity – The position of data points rises and falls in a periodic 
waveform 
 
Through analysis of the data, sources of variations can be identified and 
understood which allow improved process control and management. For 
instance, trends of data can suggest when tools are becoming worn, or when 
routine maintenance of machinery is required e.g. oil changes. 
Doty (1996) provides nine steps for constructing Control Charts; 
1. Select the quality characteristic 
2. Develop a quality plan 
3. Select the type of Control Chart 
4. Choose the proper subgroup size 
5. Collect the data 
6. Determine the trial control limits and the chart midpoint 
7. Determine the revised control limits and chart midpoint 
8. Construct the revised Control Chart 
9. Continue to use the chart 
2.8.2.2 Process Capability 
Process capability studies are used to assess the performance of a process 
relative to its specification criteria (Breyfogle, 1999). In essence, process 
capability asks ‘Is this process able to do what is asked of it?’. Process 
capability studies differentiate between conformance to control limits, 
determined by the natural variation of the process, and conformance to 
specification or tolerance limits, which are ultimately set by the customer 
through design. In order to be capable, the natural spread of the process must 
lie within the specification limits. If this is not the case then defects will occur. 
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2.8.2.3 Shortcomings of SPC 
SPC can be difficult to implement in low volume manufacturing as there may not 
be enough data to accurately estimate process parameters (Woodhall and 
Montgomery, 1999). Also, these methods can be difficult to implement when 
staff members do not possess the statistical knowledge required in order to use 
the tools effectively. 
Breyfogle (1999) finds that collection and reporting of data can be expensive, 
and ‘should not be prioritised over process improvement efforts’. Furthermore, 
he states that organisations only focus on measuring the output of the process 
when applying Control Charts, which does not allow defects to be avoided, only 
detected. Rather, more emphasis should be put on measuring process inputs 
and stopping production when these go out of control. 
Finally, the bottom line is that SPC does not ensure customer satisfaction. A 
poor product can still be made to all the manufacturing requirements (Oakland, 
2003).  
2.9 Summary 
This section has given an overview of the key areas that are associated with 
this research. Firstly, quality has been defined and its meaning explored in a 
manufacturing context, which has allowed higher level systems that are used by 
businesses to manage quality to be studied.  Also, clear meanings have been 
obtained for relevant terminology associated with process analysis.   
The concept of Lean has been covered by studying its underlying principles and 
the different forms of waste that can exist. Instances of where Lean has been 
adopted and applied have also been investigated that show that it is a broad 
applicable philosophy. Also, the shortcomings and issues published in the 
literature have been reviewed.  
Error proofing, or Poka-Yoke, techniques have been explained, with attention 
given to the difference that can exist between them. Best practice has been 
identified that allows the user to best design a device to prevent mistakes 
occurring.   
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The fundamentals of System Engineering and Process Modelling have been 
explained, and the guidelines for best practice and potential weaknesses of 
these methods have been identified. The mechanics of FMEA have been 
detailed, including the various types of failure mode, the different forms of 
FMEA that can be used, improvements that have been made to the FMEA 
procedure and the potential shortcomings that have been experienced with its 
use in the field.  
The Failure Mode Avoidance framework has been explained, including the 
principles and tools that it comprises, which has allowed the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach to be discussed. Finally, statistical quality 
improvement methods, such as Six Sigma, have been identified and their 
methodologies examined in order to understand the issues that have been 
found with these techniques so that they can be addressed in the research.  
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3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Review of Current Practice 
Due to the pressures associated with increasing production rates whilst 
simultaneously reducing manufacturing costs that are described in Chapter 1, 
the Company has embarked on a Lean transformation. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the current state and the vision of the future state of the Company’s 
manufacturing operations, demonstrating the overall aims of the transformation 
as a case of ‘before and after’.  
Current State Future State 
 No levelling of schedule 
 Parts made to schedule not demand 
(Push not Pull) 
 No visual controls or management 
 No safety culture or controls 
 No Poke Yoke/Root cause analysis 
culture 
 Disorganised,- No 5S culture 
 No process standards 
 No continuous improvement culture 
 No flow 
 Large amounts of inventory & work in 
progress 
 Machines breaking down 
 No ownership 
 No teamwork 
 ‘Waste’ everywhere 
 Close coupled sequential processes 
 Single piece flow production 
 Visually controlled environment 
 Orderly, safe and clean – 5S 
 Controlled inventory/WIP 
 Clear targets and metrics 
 Quality and control in all processes 
 Quick equipment changeovers 
 Controlled buffers 
 Root cause analysis 
 Kaizen driven problem solving 
 Balanced workstations 
 Standard operations 
 Minimum waste 
 Shorter lead times 
 Value added culture with operators 
 Process confirmation 
Table 3 Current and Future State of the Company's Manufacturing Operation 
At the time of this project, the Company was going through this transition. Some 
aspects of the change have been successful, whereas others are proving more 
challenging and exposing weaknesses in the Company. These weaknesses are 
compromising the effectiveness of the implemented changes. Section 2.3.6 of 
the literature review suggested that in order for full and continued exploitation of 
Lean techniques, the philosophy has to be realised as a whole and it is 
perceived that this scenario is being realised in this instance.   
Through observations made by the Author, there was clear visual evidence of 
the initiatives that have been successfully embraced by the Company. The 
adoption of a 5S standard, visual control and communication of the 
performance and status of production areas, minimum inventory, Kanban 
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systems, and a sequential, single piece flow line are all in place. There was an 
apparent cultural emphasis on continuous improvement with kaizen processes 
in operation. 
Furthermore, daily reviews, dubbed DSUMs (Daily Start Up Meeting) were 
common place. These were conducted in individual production areas, such as 
‘Front Fuselage Zone 1’, ‘Environment System Loom Assembly’ and ‘Flaperon 
SPF’, are led by the area supervisor and involve the entire team. Having 
attended multiple DSUMs the Author has identified that meetings were based 
upon a consistent structure of Safety, Quality, Cost, Delivery and People 
(SQCDP). Under each of these topics performance metrics are shared, 
potential issues and resurrections are discussed and relevant Company 
information disseminated. It has also been observed that these meetings are 
hierarchical within the Organisation, as the supervisor will report into a higher 
level WSUM (Weekly Start Up Meeting) with their managers in order to provide 
vertical information transfer through the Business.  
However, there were areas of the future state vision that had not made the 
transformation required to exercise a deeper cultural change and yield a holistic 
improvement to the Company. These aspects are those associated with the 
individual control of parts and processes at a manufacturing level. In particular, 
and in reference to Table 3, the present weaknesses are related to the quality 
and control in processes and root cause analysis, which result in high levels of 
defective parts, ineffective prevention process improvement actions and 
ultimately continued waste and escalated costs of production. Fundamentally, 
improving visual management and flow is futile whilst incorrect parts are made; 
making the defective parts efficiently does not quantify a valid improvement.  
The Author found that control plans did not exist in the same manner as 
illustrated in Section 2.1.2.3 of the literature review. Instead, control measures 
were administered in the general manufacturing planning by reference to 
generic specifications that relate to each of the manufacturing processes. The 
reliance is then on the operator or fitter to reference these specifications during 
manufacture. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these were not regularly 
consulted by the work force.  
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On the event of non-conformance, components were managed through a 
procedure known as the Material Review Board (MRB). This procedure consists 
of examining the component, identifying corrective action and subsequently 
conducting necessary rework or scrapping the item. If it was judged that a 
component has failed for the same reason on more than three occasions, then 
a root cause analysis would be recommended. 
This describes a reactive approach to quality and conformance. Production 
operations rely on reference to broad standards and provide operators freedom 
to manufacture parts based on prior knowledge and experience. Part 
conformance was proved through inspection methods and corrected if possible. 
During planning, potential failures were not considered in detail and therefore 
the control methods in place are generalised and were not specific to the 
manufacture of distinct components. Consequently, quality control was more 
prevalent than quality assurance.    
However, there was evidence of improvement activities and initiatives within the 
Company. For instance, Process Mapping exercises were held in cross 
functional groups as attended by the Author. These appear to have been 
effective for a shared understanding of processes by the stakeholders, but 
improvement action and continuing monitoring and improvement did not appear 
to stem from these methods, as if completing the task was its own reward.  
Furthermore, they were at a business process level and therefore did not 
effectively capture the characteristic detail of the components or the 
manufacturing methods by which they were created and thus overstepped any 
means to control the manufacture of complex aerospace parts. 
In terms of process variability reduction, the Company had a ‘Producability’ 
team which conducted Six Sigma projects.  However, it would seem that these 
projects were not heavily bought into by the Business on the whole, illustrated 
by the fact that the team comprised of 6 permanent staff that practice the 
associated DMAIC technique in a business of roughly 9000. Furthermore, 
Nonthaleerak & Hendry (2008) state that a typical Six Sigma project will last 
between 4-6 months. As it is not uncommon that these projects were ongoing 
after 12 months, without demonstrating any significant implementation of 
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process improvement, it suggests that there may have been issues associated 
with scoping these activities. 
There was also evidence to suggest the occasional use of FMEAs. However, in 
the Author’s experience these instances had been reactive, stimulated as a 
response to an overly defective or costly area of manufacture, rather than 
during preliminary design and development, or had been led by machinery 
suppliers in order to assure delivery of the required capability. Although 
conducted as a team consisting of relevant process stakeholders, they were 
performed through brainstorming activities and did not apply associated tools in 
order to enhance the capture of failure modes. In addition, formal control plans 
were not developed as a consequence. The size of these documents was in the 
order of 500 line items and above, and similar to the mapping exercises, they 
were not performed at a level that captures detailed part or process 
characteristic data. 
In summary, although proven practices existed, they were often performed 
ineffectively, in isolation from one another and without clear intent. The 
evidence suggested that these activities were not correctly scoped in order to 
allow the development of an appropriate understanding that facilitates 
improvement action capable of fostering suitable control at a part manufacture 
level. Furthermore, there did not appear to a standard practice for the use of 
these tools that was appropriately governed and applied.  
Consequently, within the Company there exists both an opportunity and an 
appetite to implement a new strategy to ensure that production is in control to 
allow the simultaneous increase in manufacturing rates and decrease in 
associated costs required to remain competitive in the global aerospace market.  
3.2 Analysis of Requirements for MFMA Process Development 
The literature has provided an overview into some of the tools and techniques 
that can be applied to enhance control over processes and parts that allow 
improvements in quality to be made. The Company required a means to apply 
these techniques in order to facilitate a step change in the control of their 
manufacturing operations and move away from the traditional methods used in 
the aerospace industry which are associated with reliance of craftsmanship 
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skills and lengthy and expensive corrective actions. This would also allow the 
Company to fully realise the benefits of the changes that have already been 
implemented.  
Throughout Section 2 methods and tools have been provided for establishing 
control and facilitating improvement in both product design and process 
operation. FMEA, as discussed in Section 2.6, is a popular tool and logical in its 
approach towards improving robustness, but it has many underlying 
weaknesses, particularly associated with its reputation for being an arduous 
activity and not leading to corrective action. P Diagrams, Boundary Diagrams, 
Cause and Effect Analysis and Process Mapping are all effective techniques to 
understand how a process functions, and the relationships that are pivotal and 
detrimental to this effect, but the benefit of these practices is limited when they 
are used in isolation.   
In terms of more overarching processes Six Sigma, Advanced FMEA, FMA and 
APQP provide established examples. Six Sigma has had a wide uptake, has 
demonstrated success and uses a range of process tools, but it has 
weaknesses associated with project selection and scoping, particularly when 
the process is ill defined, and the outputs of the effort are difficult to implement 
without a robust quality system. Advanced FMEA demonstrates improvements 
over the traditional FMEA procedure, providing a more systematic approach to 
failure mode identification, but it is seen as overly rigorous and consequently 
detrimental to the ‘free thinking’ of the team. Furthermore, the method provided 
does not illustrate a direct input into control planning and ‘closing the loop’; the 
final step, as shown in Figure 2-7, is broadly titled ‘Propose Solutions’. FMA 
uses a structured approach to scope and manage improvement actions through 
the use of a top-down functional decomposition, typical of systems engineering, 
and prescribes a series of proven tools. However, it has been developed and 
tested / validated in a context of design of products and systems rather than 
processes. APQP gives a high level, end to end method to product and process 
planning, but does not have the detailed structure and information flow of FMA 
or Advanced FMEA that is beneficial for implementation.    
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Consequently, there was a requirement for a procedure that can combine the 
strengths of these processes and tools described. FMA possesses a structure 
at a similar level to Advanced FMEA, captures a holistic view akin to APQP, and 
could be used to provide scope for improvement strategies like Six Sigma and 
other process capability studies. Furthermore, in one form or another, it utilises 
proven engineering tools ensuring that their output is used effectively which 
provides context, rationale and greater benefit when compared to an isolated 
application. This is achieved by a strong information flow between the tools. As 
a result, the FMA methodology and philosophy will provide the backbone for a 
new process that will be developed for application on manufacturing process 
design and control. 
In order to achieve this requirement, the methodology needed to be outlined, 
trialled and proven effective to allow for adoption by the Company. In the 
context of the Business the overriding requirement was to develop a 
methodology that is capable of reducing costs through improvements in part 
quality that are created by robust process control. Therefore, in summary, the 
methodology was based on the principle, structure and approach of the FMA 
framework but needed to be customised for application in a manufacturing 
process environment.  
3.3 Proposed Manufacturing Failure Mode Avoidance Framework 
The fundamental philosophy that underpins FMA is that ‘robustness is failure 
mode avoidance’. In essence, robustness is preventing any opportunities for 
failure. The key strengths and novelties of FMA have previously been 
discussed, but for clarity the characteristic features of the process that enable 
its success and will subsequently be adopted for a Manufacturing Failure Mode 
Avoidance (MFMA) framework are as follows; 
 High level steps with clear objectives to provide an overarching structure 
to the process 
 Dedicated, proven engineering tools used to achieve each objective, 
which scope and define engineering efforts 
 A coherent flow of information between the tools that facilitates the 
analysis and allows it to be managed effectively 
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 A functional approach to the analysis, which has proven successful at 
identifying failure modes 
To be effective, a MFMA framework needed to inherit these characteristics to 
achieve the following objectives; 
 Map complex aerospace manufacturing processes at a functional level 
 Identify all process failure modes and the mechanisms of failure 
 Provide clear scope and objective for process improvements 
 Define methods for specific process controls 
The MFMA framework was developed by examining each of the higher level 
steps of the FMA framework, their objectives and the tools that have been used 
to achieve them and devising an equivalent step for manufacturing process 
analysis and improvement based on the literature. An overview of the MFMA 
framework, demonstrated in tandem with the FMA framework, is illustrated in 
Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 Overview of the FMA and MFMA frameworks 
3.3.1 Step 1 
The first step of the FMA framework aims to understand how the system 
performs its function. This is achieved through synergistic use of a Boundary 
Diagram, System State Flow Diagram, Interface Matrix and a Function Tree. 
Together these tools define the scope of the analysis, identify the flows of 
energy between the components and records their states at instants between 
them, analyse the intentional and unintentional relationships between the 
components and provide a cascade showing the functional hierarchy within the 
system. It is quoted in the literature that these tools can be used in any order. 
A corresponding objective of the first step of a MFMA framework was to 
understand how the process achieves its function. As discussed in Section 2.5 
of the literature review, a process can be modelled as a system with inputs and 
outputs, using functional block diagrams. Consequently, the process can be 
defined at the highest level using a single block. As a result, a Boundary 
Failure Mode Avoidance
O
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
T
o
o
ls
• Understand how the system 
achieves its function, 
identifying relationships and 
interfaces between internal 
and external systems
• Boundary Diagram
• System State Flow Diagram
• Interface Matrix
• Function Tree
• Identify system failures based on 
system function requirement and 
the effects of the failures
• Prioritise failure modes based on 
severity
• Identify noise factors that 
cause failures due to both 
hardware and robustness 
failures of the system
• Identify control factors
• Design noise 
management strategies 
based on failure modes
• Verify effectiveness and 
implement
• P Diagram
• Fault Tree
• Robustness Worksheet
• Design Verification Plan
• FMEA
1.Understand 
system function
2. Identify failure 
modes and effects
3. Determine the 
cause of failure
4. Develop and verify 
countermeasures
Manufacturing Failure Mode Avoidance
O
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
T
o
o
ls
• Map the process, identifying 
the way in which the Critical 
Characteristics (CC) of the 
part are achieved
• Identify factors that can affect 
part CCs
• Boundary Diagram
• Process Maps
• Process Flow Diagram
• Characteristic Matrix
• Identify process failure modes, 
focusing on process functions, 
and the likely effect on part CCs
• Identify / prioritise root causes 
and scope / target for 
improvement action
• Robust countermeasure 
development for process 
improvement 
• Define methods for 
production validation 
and ongoing process 
control
• Six Sigma / DMAIC
• Process / machinery 
capability studies
• SPC, condition monitoring
• Process Control 
Plans
• Process FMEA
1. Process 
Functional Analysis
2. Process Failure 
Mode Identification
3.Process 
Improvement
4.Process Control  
and Validation
55 
 
Diagram is used, scoping the analysis in the same way as it is used in FMA. 
However, in this case, the Boundary Diagram records the transformation of the 
part, rather than the energy flows within a system. In doing this, the Boundary 
Diagram also captures the interfaces to the process that are external to the 
boundary.  
Next, where FMA uses a System State Flow Diagram to identify the internal 
flows of energy, the process can be deconstructed into individual steps using a 
functional Process Map. This combines the best practice of Process Mapping 
and functional block diagrams, discussed in Section 2.5.1.1.2 and Section 2.5.2, 
to separate the process into a flow of discrete functions, and allow the part’s 
state to be recorded at the instants between them. The complexity of the 
processes is managed through this decomposition. As advised, the functions 
are described using a ‘Verb Object’ convention, flow from left to right, refrain 
from mapping time lapse activities and are completed to a level which can be 
engineered.  
A Process Flow Diagram adopts the process structure defined through the 
functional Process Map, adding further detail relating to the transformation by 
cataloguing the part and process characteristics that are used or changed at 
each step. This should include the magnitude and metric of the characteristic 
where possible. This tool provides the first opportunity to list the sources of 
variation that are known to be present at each operation. Figure 3-2 shows an 
example of the Process Flow Diagram, populated using a fictitious 
manufacturing process, to demonstrate the format of this document and the 
information captured.  
 
Figure 3-2 Example of Process Flow Diagram 
 
Sources of Variation Process Function Graphical Flow Part Characteristics Process Characteristics
Position within Clamp
Contamination
Locate Item 1 Orientation (X,Y, Z)
Position (mm)
Clamp
Clamp Pressure
Drill Sharpness
Material Hardness
Drill Hole 1 x M8 Hole (mm) Drill
Drill Speed
Drill Feed Rate
Insert Size
Contamination
Locate Insert X Insert X in M8 Hole Pressure
Insert Angle
Contamination
Screw in Item 2 Item 1 and Item 2 Assembly Angle of Entry
Torque
10
20
30
40
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Where FMA uses an Interface Matrix to identify casual relationships between 
the elements of the system, MFMA uses a Characteristics Matrix to identify and 
understand the relationships between the part and the process characteristics. 
The material associated with these characteristics flows inwardly from the 
outputs of the previous mapping exercises, establishing the distinguishing 
information flow that is one the foundations of the FMA framework. This 
document is an enhanced version of the example provided in Figure 2-5, as 
shown in Figure 3-3 using the same fictitious example for demonstration as in 
the previous Figure. 
Whilst conserving the original tabular format with the part characteristics on the 
vertical axis and the process operations on the horizontal, this tool has been 
developed to provide more detail by adding the process function, process 
characteristics and relevant metrics. Where suitable, the characteristics have 
been isolated so that they are analysed individually and as a whole to provide a 
deepened understanding of the interrelationships within the process. Using a 
matrix over a series of cause and effect diagrams delivers the benefits 
described in Section 2.5.3 of the literature review, allowing greater amounts of 
information to be contained, identifying the impacts of characteristics changes 
and inputs on successive operations and providing an ‘edit–friendly’ format. A 
tailorable Key allows symbols to be added and removed as necessary so that 
this tool has the flexibility required to be applied to any process.  
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Figure 3-3 Example of an Enhanced Characteristics Matrix 
 
In contrast to FMA, these tools are used in succession in order to provide 
information flow and a logical break down of the process. This is not to say that 
they cannot be developed iteratively, as the completion of one tool highlights a 
discrepancy with a previous one, but it must be appreciated that the 
Characteristic Matrix cannot be effectively completed without the structure and 
detail that is defined and developed through the preceding tools.  
3.3.2 Step 2 
In FMA the second step aims to identify failure modes and their effects. To 
achieve this, a Design FMEA is introduced. Despite numerous shortcomings 
associated with FMEA, the FMA approach ensures that the tool is used 
effectively by breaking down the acquisition of information over the previous 
tools. This prevents the analysis becoming overly laborious, subjective and 
cumbersome, but isn’t so rigid as to be restrictive to thinking, such as with 
Advanced FMEA. With an inflow of system information from the first step used 
to establish the FMEA, the tool is then used as a ‘living document’ that 
manages the remainder of the analysis, with consequential efforts prioritised 
using the RPN.   
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Respectively, the second step of MFMA uses a Process FMEA to identify failure 
modes and their effects, with the intention of achieving the same benefits as 
FMA; supporting the tool without being over prescriptive. The contributing 
functions of the process have been segregated in Step 1 and can flow directly 
into the Process FMEA to populate the first column and are consequently used 
as the definition of the structure and scale of resolution for the analysis. Failure 
modes are then identified individually by comparing the required function with 
the four types of failure mode that are provided by the Ford Design Institute, as 
described in section 2.6.1 of the literature review. The effects of each of these 
failures on the rest of the process can subsequently be identified by analysing 
the downstream activities within the process, through examination of the 
Process Flow Diagram which catalogues the process and part characteristics 
and the Characteristic Matrix which shows the relationships and 
interdependencies that exist between them. The Severity of each of the effects 
is scored using an appropriate and consistent scale, which is used to prioritise 
the failure modes based on relative risk. Typically, a scale should be devised 
based on the nature of the process and the part under analysis, but due to the 
scope of this research the scale that is provided by the Automotive Industry 
Action Group (2008) is used. Despite circumventing best practice, this is 
sufficient for validating the effectiveness of the methodology as it only impacts 
its ability to prioritise action, rather than the sequencing of the tools or how 
MFMA achieves its fundamental aim.  
Reaching beyond the objective of Step 2 in FMA, MFMA also identifies the 
causes of the individual failure modes at this stage. As the Characteristic Matrix 
is a tabulated form of a series of cause and effect diagrams, and is used to 
identify effects of failure modes on the remainder of the process, it stands to 
reason that it feasibly provides information relating to the causes of the failure 
modes. In this instance it requires examination of the process characteristics 
that influence how the part is transformed. It is appreciated at this stage that the 
Characteristic Matrix may not provide an in depth and fully conclusive 
description of the cause at a functional level, but is investigated further in Step 
3. As the cause has been identified, the likelihood of occurrence can be scored. 
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Again, this will is achieved through the use of the Occurrence rating scale 
provided by the Automotive Industry Action Group (2008).   
3.3.3 Step 3 
In FMA, Step 3 aims to identify the cause of the failure mode by analysing noise 
factors, or sources of variation, that can exist in the system. This is a crucial 
element in improving robustness, as once noise factors are identified they can 
be prevented thereby reducing, or eradicating entirely, the occurrence of the 
failure mode through its cause, which is the objective of Step 4. FMA utilises P 
Diagrams and a Fault Tree in this step.  
In MFMA, Step 3 operates slightly differently. The objective is to develop 
countermeasures to the failure modes through process improvements. 
However, this does involve developing a greater understanding of the causes of 
the failure modes, which have been provided in Step 2. At this stage, 
improvement and monitoring strategies like Six Sigma and process capability 
studies are applied to analyse and reduce the variation in the process and 
improve the robustness through countermeasure deployment. These strategies 
benefit from the scope and prioritisation provided by MFMA through the central 
Process FMEA, which has deconstructed the process into individual failure 
modes relevant to each operation. As a result, the weaknesses associated with 
these strategies, such as problem definition, project selection and scope creep, 
as described in the literature, can be mitigated. Outputs of these studies could 
include improved monitoring of process and part characteristics, so that trends 
can be monitored and consequently preventative action can be taken, such as 
with SPC, deployment of error proofing methods or Poka-Yoke devices, or 
process redesign if the risk is so large that such action is feasible, which would 
consequently require revisiting the previous MFMA steps as an iterative part of 
the design. Incidentally, as with FMA, there is always the option of doing 
nothing if risks are low enough to be disregarded.    
The outputs of these efforts are inputted into the FMEA within the control 
columns, either as detective or preventative controls depending on their 
orientation. The likelihood of detection of each of the failure modes is then be 
rated using the Detection scale. On the other hand, if MFMA is being applied to 
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an existing process, or to a new process which is particularly similar to an 
existing process, there may be suitable controls currently in place. In this case, 
these are input into to the FMEA. At this point the full RPN is calculated to score 
the overall risk of the failure mode, based on the severity of its effects, the 
likelihood of its occurrence and the ability of the controls to detect or prevent the 
failure.  
3.3.4 Step 4 
The final step of the FMA framework aims to develop and verify 
countermeasures to failure. In this step, management strategies are 
established, verified and implemented into the design if proven successful. This 
is achieved through the application of a Robustness Worksheet which is used to 
assess the options for each of the noise factors and a Design Verification Plan 
which manages each of the studies. If proven effective, the required 
implementation or redesign to improve the system is entered into the FMEA 
under ‘Recommended Actions’. 
In MFMA, the fourth step is also used to implement and verify the controls in 
place for reducing variation and is titled ‘Process Control and Validation’ 
accordingly. However, in this instance the countermeasures or, more 
specifically, process improvements have been designed in the previous step. 
The objective is achieved through the use of a Process Control Plan which, as 
suggested by the literature, is an effective method of implementing control 
measures, validating their effectiveness and ensuring the process output is in a 
state of control.   
The Process Control Plan is presented as a table which provides a written 
description of the systems used to control the process. It is directly populated 
with information from the FMEA and improvement efforts, therefore continuing 
the flow of information through the MFMA process. As a result, this step makes 
sure that the outputs of the FMEA are effectively used, addressing one of the 
shortcomings associated with the tool. Furthermore, as the process is 
conducted the Process Control Plan should be reviewed regularly against the 
performance of the process. Any required improvements from these reviews are 
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entered in the FMEA under ‘Recommended Actions’ and the Process Control 
Plan updated for the implementation and continued validation.  
The literature on FMA states that the relevant noise factor should be included 
as a measure in any study verifying the suitability of a countermeasure. The 
industry standard Process Control Plan abides by this suggestion, as the control 
methods are catalogued in relation to the process function and the part and 
process characteristics that are influenced at this step.   
3.3.5 Summary 
A manufacturing process based equivalent to FMA, named MFMA, has been 
devised, described and justified in relation to the literature. This method 
incorporates the distinguishing features of FMA that contribute to its success, 
which include high level steps with specific objectives, a dedicated tool set, 
clear and continued information flow between the tools and a functional 
approach to the analysis.  
When viewing Figure 3-1 on page 54, it is clear that there has been some 
rearrangement of the objectives in Steps 2, 3 and 4 of the MFMA framework 
when compared to FMA. These are conscious changes, which have been made 
to redistribute the effort more evenly over the process. Identifying the cause of 
failure has been included in Step 2 of the MFMA framework, whereas in FMA 
this is conducted entirely in Step 3. The third step of the MFMA framework is 
used to develop the process improvement required, but this will include further 
investigation of the causes of failure modes where required, so this is not 
necessarily a radical change. In both FMA and MFMA the final step is used to 
verify the improvements and provide ongoing validation. In FMA this step is also 
used to develop the countermeasure. It is felt that due to the effort associated 
with these tasks, it would be better that they were contained within Step 3 of 
MFMA in order to prevent the final step from being overly laborious, which may 
compromise its effectiveness.   
With the basis of the MFMA methodology established, a plan for validation of 
this method is required to demonstrate how effective this method is for 
identifying opportunities for process improvement and control, based on the 
principle of failure mode avoidance. 
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3.4 Validation Plan 
3.4.1 Case Study as a Research Method 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context (Yin, 1993). Anderson (1993) describes 
case studies as being concerned with how and why things happen, allowing the 
investigation of contextual realities and the differences between what was 
planned and what actually occurred. Furthermore, the strength of the case 
study is that it allows the researcher to gain a holistic view of a certain 
phenomenon or series of events (Gummesson, 1991). Consequently, as the 
MFMA framework has been designed to be used in industry, it is appropriate 
that the methodology is validated in this context in order to provide a realistic 
assessment of its performance and suitability in the field.  
There is some criticism associated with the tendency of case study research to 
lead to generalisation, when the outcomes of a study are developed into all-
encompassing blanket statements. The risk of this occurrence can be mitigated, 
firstly through appreciation of this fact when drawing conclusions from the study 
but also by conducting multiple case studies. Multiple case studies should be 
used to allow the opportunity for replication to occur as the development of 
consistent results can be considered more reliable (Noor, 2008). As a result, 
more than one case study will be used in order to further validate the MFMA 
framework and allow it to be applied in different manufacturing environments.   
3.4.2 Case Study Plan 
Although the MFMA framework was been designed with an emphasis on the 
development of new manufacturing processes, due to the length of time 
required to take a new process from the definition of its initial requirement to 
commencing in production, it was not feasible in the scope of this research to 
apply the MFMA framework to such a case. Consequently, the validation of the 
framework has been achieved through application of current manufacturing 
processes, using existing data to populate tools. However, this still 
demonstrates its effectiveness at improving robustness through the systematic 
identification of failure modes leading towards preventative action. Furthermore, 
increasing the opportunity for validation by applying the framework to existing 
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processes allows multiple case studies to be conducted which allows findings to 
be confirmed and consequently offer more reliable results. 
As features of MFMA are pre-existing and are well documented in the literature, 
such as the Six Sigma methodology, they are not be the focus of this research. 
Consequently, the emphasis of this study is to develop and validate the MFMA 
framework.  
The aim of this research, in reference to the MFMA methodology, was to 
answer the following questions; 
1. Can the tools document complex manufacturing processes?  
2. How effective is this method at developing a functional 
understanding of the process? 
3. Is there a coherent flow between the tools and how well do they 
complement one another? 
4. How effective is this method at facilitating the identification of 
failure modes, their causes and effects and provide opportunity for 
process improvement efforts? 
5. How easy it is to deploy within the organisation? 
 
These questions are answered through case study applications of the MFMA 
framework in the Company’s manufacturing environments and subsequent 
discussion. The validation of the framework is achieved through the use of two 
case studies on differing manufacturing processes. This allowed the 
performance of the framework to be analysed in alternative environments and to 
determine its applicability as an overarching process to be used in the 
Company. Furthermore, this provided an opportunity to incorporate required 
improvements identified in the first case study. Although, this could have 
jeopardised the ability of the two case studies to offer the full benefits of 
replication in providing more reliable results, it was decided that two case 
studies that allow development of the framework was a more suitable aim. 
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3.4.2.1 Case Study 1  
The first case study acts as a feasibility study of the framework and is used for 
initial verification of its suitability and effectiveness. As the success of the 
second half of the MFMA framework is reliant on the ability of the first half to 
functionally decompose the process, identify causal relationships and identify 
process failure modes in order to allow effective process improvements and 
ongoing control to be deployed, Steps 1 and 2 were the focus of the initial case 
study. Consequently, the second case study validates the process as a whole.  
This case study was be on the machining of a metallic component. There are 
two reasons behind this. Firstly, this is a manufacturing process that is common 
in many areas of the Company and secondly there is clear visual transformation 
of the component throughout the process which assisted in the identification of 
part characteristics and therefore facilitates Process Mapping activities. This 
case study was conducted in isolation from the Company’s employees in order 
to provide an initial test of the tools at capturing part and process characteristics 
from existing process documentation.  
The aims wer to; 
1. Apply the first two steps of the MFMA framework to a simple 
manufacturing process. 
2. Test the suitability of the tools to capture process information. 
3. Identify the strength of the flow of information between the tools and 
how this facilitates their completion and objective. 
4. Assess the feasibility of the MFMA framework for providing scope for 
relevant improvement and control. 
5. Identify areas of weakness of the MFMA framework that require 
improvement. 
3.4.2.2 Case Study 2 
The second case study validated the MFMA framework in its entirety, applying 
Steps 1 to 4, and incorporated any changes from the first application. 
Furthermore, during this study the MFMA framework was exposed to a team in 
order to validate it for use with the Company’s employees. 
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This manufacturing process was on the heat treatment of rivets that are used 
for assembly manufacture. This process does not lead to a visual change of the 
component, but relies on the process to transform the microstructure of the 
components. Therefore, this provided an opportunity to demonstrate how 
MFMA can be applied to a process where failure modes may be less 
recognisable than in processes that result in visual transformation, which is true 
of the previous case study. 
The aims were to; 
1. Validate the full MFMA framework on a different process. 
2. Complete the MFMA framework with the input of a team. 
3. Incorporate any developments to the MFMA framework resulting from 
the first case study. 
4. Demonstrate how the MFMA framework leads to process 
improvements and develop control plans, managed by the Process 
FMEA. 
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4 Case Study 1: MFMA Validation on a Machining Process 
Elements of this case study have previously been presented and published by 
Goodland et al. (2013) under the title ‘Towards the Development of a 
Manufacturing Failure Mode Avoidance Framework for Aerospace 
Manufacturing’.  
4.1 Introduction 
The case study was conducted in the ‘Machining Facility’ of the Aerospace 
Company. This facility conducts machining of raw billets and castings of 
titanium, aluminium and stainless steel for a range of aircraft programmes. This 
facility is home to some of the most advanced machining capabilities, with 
machinery provided by Starrag, DST and Mazak, which are capable of 
machining to a tolerance of microns.  
For this case study, the process that was been selected to assess the feasibility 
of the MFMA framework and validate its structure, internal objectives and tool 
set was that of the manufacture of a small stainless steel aircraft bracket. With 
assistance from staff within the facility, this process was selected due to its 
appropriateness for an initial application of the MFMA framework based on the 
following criteria;  
 Design – The part consists of a variety of component features which will 
test the framework to identify and track throughout the process. 
 Size – The finished component is of a scale suitable to view and 
examine. 
 Time scale – This part is manufactured in a single day and therefore 
can be witnessed feasibly. Due to the size and complexity of some 
components manufactured in the facility, a single machining operation 
can run for well over 12 hours. 
 Rate – These components are made regularly enough to allow the 
process to be witnessed on multiple occasions 
 
The part is machined entirely in the Mazak cell on a Mazak FH - 6800, a two 
pallet horizontal machining centre. The cell is operated by five staff that, 
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although not directly involved in the completion of the case study, offers 
support, information and provides clarity throughout the process.  
As the manufacturing operations of the Company are for the military and 
defence industry, photographs, drawings and part details are forbidden and 
have been omitted where necessary. However, this is not at the detriment of the 
study to validate the MFMA framework and toolset as ample detail is permitted 
in order to apply the tools.  
4.2 Aims 
The aim of this case study was to apply the MFMA framework to a simple 
manufacturing process in order to test its feasibility of identifying process failure 
modes and providing scope for improvement activity. Ultimately, the case study 
aims to assess the effectiveness of the tools, their sequencing and information 
flow and finally the ease at which potential failure modes are realised. 
Consequently, the requirements of this study were to complete the first two 
steps of the MFMA framework through the application of the proposed tool set; 
1. Boundary Diagram – Scope the process 
2. Process Map – Break the process down into key steps, mapping part 
characteristics 
3. Process Flow Diagram – Identify the parameters that create part 
characteristics 
4. Characteristic Matrix – Identify and understand the relationships 
between the part and the process  
5. Process FMEA – Identify failure modes, their causes and effects and 
rate severity 
 
By completing these documents, the strength of each of the tools, and the 
information flow between them can be examined. 
4.3 Results 
The tools were completed by witnessing the manufacture of the part, using the 
objective of the tools to focus the observations. Information was also provided 
by using existing process documents, such as part drawings, and through 
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regular, informal discussions with the cell operators. The MFMA framework 
assumes that all materials entering the process do so as specified, i.e. without 
pre-existing faults. 
4.3.1 Step 1 – Process Functional Analysis 
4.3.1.1 Boundary Diagram 
Figure 4-1 shows the Boundary Diagram, which is used to capture the 
transformation of the part. In the context of the MFMA framework, the Boundary 
Diagram is intended to provide a graphical representation of the process being 
analysed and to scope the rest of the analysis. This is achieved by defining the 
process in terms of an input and an output at the highest level, describing the 
state of the part in measureable terms, identifying the internal interfaces that 
achieve this and the external interfaces which are influential to the process. 
Consequently, it is effectively a single functional block diagram, which is clearly 
illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1 Boundary Diagram 
 
Using material specifications, the input to the process has been detailed in 
terms of its physical state in terms of the billet material and its size. The length 
of the billet has not been recorded, as this was not detailed in existing 
documentation. Discussion with the operators confirmed that this is variable and 
as a result is not documented in the specification. 
Inputs
Rectangular Billet
 Corrosion resistant steel
 Square section , XX x XX mm
Outputs
 Max Length – 180.6mm
 Max Depth – 29mm
 Max Width – 47mm
 Base Thickness -2mm
 Lug – as drawn
 Latch – as drawn
 Base Geometry (x,y)mm from Datum AB
1. (XX,XX)
2. (XX,XX)
3. (XX,XX)
4. (XX,XX)
5. (XX,XX)
6. (XX,XX)
 Hole Content – Positional Tolerances ±0.2mm
1. (XX,XX) φ Xmm
2. (XX,XX) φ Xmm
3. (XX,XX) φ Xmm
4. (XX,XX) φ Xmm
5. (XX,XX) φ Xmm Threaded @ MJX x 1
Maintenance
EnvironmentTapping Gel
Tool Condition
Materials Properties
Coolant
Clamping
Drilling
Profiling
Tapping
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The output was described in terms of the features of the component that are 
created during the process. These are physical characteristics, and are 
described in terms of geometry, hole content, in regards to size and position, 
and features such as threads. These have been obtained using part drawings 
and the ‘Condition of Supply’ detailed by the customer, who in this case is 
internal, and are verified through a visual inspection of the part.  
The internal interfaces provide an appreciation of the systems that are used 
within the process, in order to identify areas of focus for the analysis, but 
without detailing how and when the characteristics are achieved as this is not 
appropriate at this stage. Together they provide an overview of the 
transformation of the part within the process. The external interfaces 
demonstrate exchanges that can directly or indirectly affect the ability of the 
system to achieve its output and that may require investigation during the 
MFMA framework.  
By documenting the process in this way, the requirement of the process has 
been deduced. With the input and output known, the boundary represents a 
transfer function. In order to understand this transfer function and identify how 
the part characteristics are created, the boundary is decomposed into a series 
of operations.  
4.3.1.2 Process Map 
Figure 4-2 demonstrates how the process defined using the Boundary Diagram 
was functionally deconstructed into a series of finite operations (the detail from 
the input and output boxes have been removed for appropriateness of 
presentation).  
 
Figure 4-2 Functional Process Map 
 
Operation 30.2
Cut Pallet Out
[mm]
Operation 30.3
Clamp across Pallet Out
[N/m^2]
Operation 30.4
Cut Base Profile
Drill Holes 1 – 5
[mm]
Operation 30.1
Clamp Billet
[N/m^2]
Input
Operation 30.5
Apply Tapping Agent
[ml]
Operation 30.6
Tap Hole 5
[Thread]
Operation 30.7
Cut Latch Profile
Cut Lug Profile
[mm]
Output
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Using the Process Map, the principal process functions derived in the Boundary 
Diagram evolve into a sequence of activities, which can be deemed 
independent from each other due to transportation, operator intervention, 
change of tool and so forth.  
A brief description is provided for each operation, which gives an appreciation of 
the state of the part after each of the process steps. As intended, a ‘Verb 
Object’ convention has been used as this supports the mapping exercise. The 
part characteristic, or transformation, that is created, altered or influenced 
during each operation has been recorded, along with its measurable.  
Breaking the process down by this means provides a structure for the 
subsequent analysis, as the higher level process demonstrated in the Boundary 
Diagram is divided into manageable components, but which maintain 
association with one another as the output of a previous operation is the input to 
the next. The operations have been defined at a constant level and with a 
consistent numbering format which provides structure for the rest of the 
analysis. 
With the process requirements captured in the Boundary Diagram providing a 
supportive inward flow of information, the Process Map maps these across 
succinct activities that contribute to the transfer function represented by the 
boundary, effectively breaking it down into a series of independent, but linked 
functions. Consequently, an understanding is gained of when and how each of 
the part characteristics is created, which is the first step in establishing a linkage 
between the part and process that allows the functional relationships to be 
understood and analysed.  
This tool was completed by ‘walking the process’ and identifying the key 
operations which are summarised by the Boundary Diagram.  
4.3.1.3 Process Flow Diagram 
The Process Flow Diagram is a more detailed expansion of the Process Map. 
The Process Flow Diagram takes the sequential structure of the Process Map 
and it’s descriptions of each of the steps and adds more technical information, 
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related specifically to that process step. This is demonstrated in the extract 
shown in Figure 4-3.  
The sequence of operations, as compiled in the Process Map, is shown 
centrally within the document and in the column to the left the process function 
has been described. This information has flowed directly from the Process Map.   
 
Figure 4-3 Process Flow Diagram 
On the right hand side of the table the part and process characteristics are 
shown. The part characteristics relate to the physical state of the part and are 
completed using the existing information flowing inwardly from the Boundary 
Diagram. The process characteristics are measurable inputs of the process that 
are used to create the part characteristics and represent the parameters which 
are influential and that can be actively controlled by the process.  
On the extreme left of the table, the sources of variation, or ‘noise factors’, for 
each of the process steps are recorded. These are interfaces that are influential 
on the outcome of part characteristics but generally cannot be easily controlled, 
i.e. they vary but are difficult to monitor or change at will. These are identified 
using the external interfaces documented on the Boundary Diagram.  
The format of this document means that the additional information is 
documented against each process operation, which is beneficial as it develops 
a relationship between part and process characteristics, which was founded in 
the Process Map. By breaking these activities down over a number of 
complimentary tools the integrity of data is not compromised; the information is 
manageable and thorough. This document provides the scope and level of 
Sources of Variation Process Function Graphical Flow Part Characteristics Process Characteristics
Tool sharpness
Tool length
Material hardness
Age of coolant
Pull back pressure
Contamination
Ambient temperature
Cut Base Profile,
Drill Holes 1 - 5
Cut Base Profile
(x,y)mm from Datum AB;
1. (XX,XX)
2. (XX,XX)
3. (XX,XX)
4. (XX,XX)
5. (XX,XX)
6. (XX,XX)
Drill Holes 1 - 5
(x,y)mm from Datum AB;
Positional tolerance ± X.Xmm
1. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
2. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
3. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
4. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
5. (X,X) φ Xmm
Machining program [XXXX]
Tool type [XXXX]
Tool feed rate [m/s]
Spindle speed [RPM]
Operation 30.4
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resolution for the Process FMEA as it details separate operations, their 
functional requirement and the causal relationships which led to the requirement 
being achieved or compromised. 
4.3.1.4 Characteristic Matrix 
As the Process Flow Diagram has collected detailed information about the part 
and process characteristics, illustrating the requirements of the process, a 
Characteristic Matrix can be produced to identify the what, how and when. 
Figure 4-4 shows an extract of this document. 
 
Figure 4-4 Characteristic Matrix 
As shown, the critical process parameters have been listed along the horizontal 
axis of the matrix, categorised by the operation in which they occur. Along the 
vertical axis, the part characteristics are listed, as determined in the Process 
Flow Diagram, and are formatted according to the operation in which they are 
created. The function of the operation is stated and, as with the process 
parameters, the metric by which they are measured is given. Again, the 
structure of this document is designed to easily incorporate the information 
generated in the previous documents, allowing for efficient completion.  
The Characteristic Matrix is used to identify and characterise the nature of the 
cause and effect relationships and interfaces between the part and the process. 
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30.4
Cut Base Profile,
Drill Holes 1 - 5
Cut Base Profile, (x,y)mm from Datum AB;
1. (XX,XX)
2. (XX,XX)
3. (XX,XX)
4. (XX,XX)
5. (XX,XX)
6. (XX,XX)
[mm]  (x,y) R R R R R X X X X CL
Drill Holes 1 - 5, (x,y)mm from Datum AB;
1. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
2. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
3. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
4. (XX,XX) φ X.Xmm
5. (XX,XX) φ Xmm
Position - [mm (x,y)]
Diameter - [mm]
R R R R R X X X X X X X X
Key
X - Characteristic created or changed by process parameter
C - Characteristic used for clamping
L - Characteristic used for location
R - Process parameter at one operation has a strong effect on product characteristic generated at 
another
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To do this, a Key was developed in order to represent the nature of the different 
relationships existing in the process under examination. Through the creation 
and use of a tabulated form of the process, all relationships can be 
systematically and independently considered which enables a comprehensive 
understanding of the mechanisms of the process, by documenting specifically 
how and when characteristics influence each other throughout its entirety.  
For instance, as the extract in Figure 4-4 shows, the part characteristics created 
in operation 30.4 are used for clamping and location in operation 40.2. As a 
result, it has been identified that the process characteristics applied during 
operation 30.4 have a significant effect on the ability of operation 40.2 to 
achieve its function and thus demonstrates interdependency. A linkage is also 
identified between operations 30.4 and 30.6 as holes drilled in the former are 
tapped in the latter, demonstrating another linkage not only between the part 
and process but from one operation to another.  
Consequently, this Characteristic Matrix is an information rich document and the 
data it contains provides a strong foundation for the identification of potential 
failure modes as it highlights dependencies between the parts and process, 
which aids in identifying the effects, or causes, of process failures on 
subsequent, or respectively preceding, operations. The Characteristic Matrix 
has also effectively maintained the scope of the analysis that was defined from 
the Boundary Diagram and is intended to be preserved throughout the MFMA 
framework.  
4.3.2 Step 2 – Process Failure Mode Identification  
Once a detailed, functional understanding has been developed in Step 1, 
including the process requirements, the operations used to achieve them and 
the interdependent relationships that the process relies on, process failure 
modes were systematically identified and examined in Step 2 using a Process 
FMEA.  
4.3.2.1 Process FMEA 
The Process FMEA identifies potential modes of failure within the 
manufacturing process, by focussing on the intended function of each step of 
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the process, and the likely effect these failures will have on the part 
characteristics.  
During this step the aim is to complete the left hand side of the document, which 
outlines the mechanism of failure and will be utilised in Step 3 to provide scope 
for improvement action.  
Figure 4-5 shows these components of the Process FMEA and how their 
completion is supported by information flow from the previous tools.  
The ‘Process Function’ and ‘Process Requirement’ columns were populated 
directly by information from the Characteristic Matrix, which was first 
documented in the Boundary Diagram and then developed upon in the Process 
Map and Process Flow Diagram. Through the comprehensive understanding of 
the process achieved by these tools, failure modes were identified with 
reference to the four types of failure mode as listed in Section 2.6.1. 
The effects of the failure mode on the rest of the process is then examined, this 
is achieved through the support of the Characteristic Matrix. As illustrated in 
Figure 4-5, by following the rows associated with this process function and its 
part characteristics, instances where these features interface with other aspects 
of the process can be observed conveniently. In this case, these features are 
used for a clamping and location operation in the next stage of the process.  
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Figure 4-5 Process FMEA 
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The Severity of each of the effects of failure was rated using the scale provided 
by the Automotive Industry Action Group and the most severe outcome 
documented in the ‘Severity’ column. As previously discussed, there is an 
opportunity to develop tailorable criteria, or a selection of various criteria for 
different processes, but this is not a priority at this time.  
The potential causes of failure were identified using the Characteristic Matrix, 
but also the sources of variation that are contained in the Process Flow 
Diagram. Examining which process characteristics are influential on the part 
characteristics, denoted by a symbol at their intersection on the Characteristic 
Matrix, was effective at providing a means to identify the causal relationship 
between the process and the part and subsequently the causes of the failure. 
The sources of variation provide external causal factors, that are not directly 
engineered within the process but influence its outcome. Step 3 of the MFMA 
framework would then take the problem statement provided by the failure mode, 
its effects and causes and use it to scope further investigation and 
countermeasure development. As with the effects of failure, and as is 
customary, the likelihood of the occurrence of each of the cause of failure 
modes is recorded using the standardised criterion.   
4.4 Discussion 
The Boundary Diagram is effective at determining the beginning and the end of 
the process that is the focus of the MFMA study, achieved by defining the part’s 
state at these instances. However, in this case study it is clear that only the 
geometric features of the part have been captured. Although these describe the 
main transformational requirements of the process, it does not allow for the fact 
that other failure modes may exist. For instance, the process could fail by 
misidentifying the part or not transporting the part into the correct location after 
processing.  
This tool is also used to initially identify the internal and external interfaces. The 
internal interfaces are easier to identify, as they are based upon what needs to 
happen in order to meet the requirements, whereas acknowledgement of the 
external interfaces is susceptible to brainstorming, rather than a structured 
method of identification. Regardless of these weaknesses, the Boundary 
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Diagram does effectively capture the manufacturing process at the highest 
level, which is essential for functional decomposition.  
The Process Map is successful in deconstructing the process in order to identify 
when each of the part characteristics is created. However, as it was conducted 
on just one level, it could be argued that it is too ‘one dimensional’ and fails to 
capture processes that occur within each of the process steps it defines. For 
example, in Operation 30.4 the profile is cut and the holes are drilled, which 
results in the largest physical transformation of the part at any one point, but 
this is too broad a function in order to fully identify process failure modes for 
control. Many mechanisms and interfaces will exist within this process, which 
are in danger of being overlooked when the process is mapped at this level. For 
example, the order that holes are drilled could prove to be influential to the 
reliability of the process. This factor would impact how much time the tool has to 
cool between drilling operations, which could affect the accuracy of the tool 
based on thermal expansion that occurs as a result of drilling the previous hole 
and therefore affect the accuracy of the subsequently drilled hole. 
Consequently, although the Process Map describes the operations that create 
the part characteristics, improvements could be made to the tool to describe 
and clarify each of the part characteristics after each operation in order to better 
understand how they are being altered throughout the process. 
The strength of the Process Flow Diagram is how it summarises all the process 
information succinctly and in reference to each step; in order to complete this 
document the process needs to be well understood. However, as the tools are 
linked together in order to allow information flow, the Process Flow Diagram is 
restricted to the level of detail captured in the Process Map, which as discussed 
is potentially insufficient. The identification and addition of process 
characteristics and sources of variation are supported by looking at each 
operation in isolation and what creates and compromises its requirement, but at 
this level of detail there is potentially too much detachment to allow all the 
information to be uncovered systematically. 
Completing the Characteristics Matrix is a very effective exercise for identifying 
part to process and process to process linkages and therefore deriving a deeper 
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understanding of how the process achieves its function and which interfaces are 
present. As a result, it is a crucial prerequisite to the Process FMEA by 
providing a logical table of what the potential causes and effects of failure 
modes can be. Furthermore, the format and structure of the information is more 
suitable and user friendly in comparison to a series of cause and effect 
diagrams. However, the incoming data from the previous tools has prescribed a 
level of examination that is perhaps not detailed enough to correctly identify all 
functional failures modes. This is illustrated in the Process FMEA, where the 
failure mode ‘Incorrect profile geometry cut’ is perhaps too vague in relation to 
the machining of the part’s geometry.  
The Process FMEA successfully pulls the functional understanding developed 
through the use of the previous tool set together in order to identify the failure 
modes that could potentially occur during the process operation. How the 
structure of the document is created, based on a functional description and 
deconstruction of the process, and the efficiency with which this tool can 
resultantly be completed is undeniable when compared to completing an FMEA 
study without the completion of supportive tools.  
Identifying the effects of failure through the use of the Characteristic Matrix is 
robust, but the ability of this method to uncover the causes of failure, especially 
when it is considered these are intended to provide specific improvement or 
control measures towards the required creation of part characteristics, 
demonstrates weakness.  
For instance, the causes identified on the Process FMEA are at differing levels 
of what can be engineered within the process. Incorrect selection of the 
machining program is a valid cause of a failure and is directly associated with 
incorrect geometrical output, but unacceptable spindle vibration due to 
insufficient pull back pressure, although a potential cause of incorrect geometry 
and a source of variation, as correctly identified, is just one of many causes that 
would affect the machinery’s capability to achieve the required geometric 
tolerance. The issue present is that the FMEA has captured causes at both an 
operational level, in terms of the machining program selection, and at a process 
capability level, leading towards machinery level. Even discounting the fact that 
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pull back pressure is only one of a variety of different potential causes of spindle 
vibration, it should be acknowledged that to remain at a consistent level of 
analysis, the cause should be ‘Insufficient machine capability’. This could then 
provide scope for an investigation of the machine’s capability in regard to 
machining the correct geometry required for this part. However, it should be 
realised that this is a failure mode at a lower process hierarchical level and 
prompt subsequent investigation at an appropriate level of detail.  It therefore 
stands to reason that further functional decomposition is required in order to 
appreciate the operation of the process on different levels, which begins at the 
Process Mapping stage, in order to allow control efforts to be appropriately 
scoped.  
In terms of the structure of the MFMA framework, the case study has confirmed 
that the sequence of the tools is appropriate and logical, beginning by defining 
what the process is intended to achieve, then how it will achieve it and the 
influences and interrelationships between the part and the process which then 
provide the foundation of how the process could fail and by what means.  
The flow of information between the tools is strong and clearly visible. This 
demonstrates the integration between the tool set, which consequently 
facilitates effective and efficient completion. This is proven by the fact that none 
of the tools, other than the initial Boundary Diagram, are compiled from a blank 
template as the structure and initial information is provided from previous 
exercises. This leads to the understanding of the process evolving throughout 
the MFMA process.  The scale of the tools is manageable, as the information 
used to build the tools flows in a logical and structured manner which largely 
mitigates the need for brainstorming activities which can be disordered, prove 
subjective and cause the scope to wander. 
4.5 Learning Outcomes 
In conclusion, the case study has been successful as an initial implementation 
of the MFMA framework. It has demonstrated that the tools are in an 
appropriate sequence, are capable of capturing process information effectively 
and that a clear flow of information exists between them that allows them to be 
completed efficiently.  
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However, it is found that identifying external interfaces and sources of variation 
are areas of weakness in the framework and require additional support.   
Furthermore, it has been discovered that a decomposition of the process at one 
level is not appropriate for correctly identifying the cause of process failure 
modes as it does not provide enough detail to understand the mechanisms of 
failure systematically or consistently. This has been identified as originating 
from the Process Map and has had a detrimental effect on the ability of the tools 
downstream to maximise their potential.    
4.6 Developments of the MFMA Framework  
Prior to the second case study implementation of the MFMA Framework, 
opportunities were identified to address the weaknesses in the framework that 
were uncovered during the first implementation.  
The Boundary Diagram was developed to capture additional information beyond 
the geometric characteristics of the part, by including characteristics of the parts 
state such as location, material specification and quantity as these factors are 
relevant towards the use of the MFMA framework in a production environment 
and also allows additional process failures to be captured. Also, differentiation 
between external and internal interfaces is achieved by defining external 
interfaces as ‘any input into the process that is not directly applied to transform 
the part’ which is considered in terms of people, parts, process and plant.  
In order to address issues associated with mapping the process on one level, 
which consequently impacted the depth of analysis in the rest of the MFMA 
framework, the Process Mapping stage will be conducted through iterative 
decomposition through levels of the process. Furthermore, each of the part 
characteristics identified on the Boundary Diagram will be stated after each 
stage of the process to prompt analysis regarding how and when they are 
changed. 
Rigour will be applied to the identification of sources of variation during the 
completion of the Process Flow Diagram by supplementing the activity with a P 
Diagram. This aims to provide an opportunity where each of the process steps 
and their function can be analysed in isolation, removed from the influence of 
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the rest of the process. It is also felt that identifying the different error states of 
the process outputs will also aid in the identification of failure modes and be a 
valuable input to the Process FMEA.    
For clarity, Figure 4-6 illustrates the proposed changes to the MFMA framework 
that will be implemented and validated through the second case study, with 
additional tools highlighted in red and tools which require development 
highlighted in blue.  
 
Figure 4-6 Developments to the MFMA Framework 
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5 Case Study 2: Deployment of MFMA on a Heat Treatment 
Process 
Elements of this case study have previously been presented and published by 
Goodland et al., (2013b) under the title ‘A Manufacturing Failure Mode 
Avoidance Framework for Aerospace Manufacturing’. 
5.1 Introduction 
The second case study was conducted in a small production facility which has 
capabilities that include machining, treatments, non-destructive and destructive 
testing and material treatment.  
The process that was selected for this study is for the heat treatment of 
aluminium rivets that are used for the assembly of products for a variety of 
aerospace programmes. This process aims to reduce the hardness of rivets that 
are procured from an external supplier in order to improve workability during 
riveting operations. This transformation is achieved by altering the 
microstructure of the material by heating them in batches and then quenching 
them in coolant, after which they are dried and stored in a freezer in order to 
prevent the rivets from hardening through natural aging.  
This process was selected to test the MFMA framework based on the following 
criteria; 
 Transformation – The part characteristics are not as immediately 
identifiable as those in the first case study as the transformation is to the 
microstructure of the material. This will validate the framework for 
application on different process to the first case study. 
 Time – This process is conducted in a single day which facilitates the 
study by allowing it to be witnessed easily and facilitating team 
involvement 
 Team Availability – A small team  of employees associated with the 
process have been made available to conduct the MFMA framework 
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Due to the sensitivity of the Company, technical data has been removed where 
necessary, but not to a degree which impacts on the ability of the case study to 
demonstrate validity of the MFMA framework.  
5.2 Aims 
The aims of this case study were to; 
1. Validate the full MFMA framework on a different process, identifying 
information flow in Steps 3 and 4 
2. Complete the MFMA framework with the input of a team 
3. Incorporate developments to the MFMA framework resulting from the first 
case study 
4. Demonstrate how the MFMA framework leads to process improvements 
and develop Control Plans, managed by the Process FMEA. 
 
5.3 MFMA Team 
A team for this case study implementation was formed to conduct the analysis. 
The team members were selected from employees of the production team 
located in the facility to ensure that they possessed the required knowledge and 
would have familiarity with the process. Individuals were also chosen based on 
their role within the business which would best allow for a cross functional team. 
The following roles were selected; 
 Research Engineer 
 Production Manager 
 Team Leader Production 
 Supply Chain 
 Treatment Supervisor 
 Mechanical Engineer x 2 
 Heat Treatment Operator x 2 
 Business Support 
 Metallurgy 
 Mechanical Test  
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The MFMA framework was conducted through the use of regular group 
meetings, lasting between 1 and 2 hours. The objective of each meeting was 
focussed around the tool sets that combine to form the MFMA framework.  
To engage with the team an initial meeting was held in order to give context to 
the study. The aims of the case study were explained from a research 
perspective, the MFMA framework, its higher level process steps and their 
objectives were described and the tools that are applied were illustrated using 
the outputs of the first case study. 
5.4 Results 
The results are presented using extracts of the tools completed during the 
study, with a description of modifications from the first case study provided 
along with observations of the team influence on their completion.  
5.4.1 Step 1 – Process Functional Analysis 
5.4.1.1 Boundary Diagram 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the Boundary Diagram produced in this study. The 
Boundary Diagram operated in a similar sense as it did in the first case study, 
using a single block diagram to define the process as an input and an output, 
described in terms of measurable characteristics, either side of the process and 
isolating it for the rest of the framework.  
Based on the findings of the first MFMA implementation, the inputs and outputs 
of the process have been expanded to include more facets than just the 
geometric characteristics. This was appropriate, as it would have proven very 
difficult to define the changes that result from this process based purely on 
these characteristics, as there is no required change geometrically. These 
additions included location, part number, number (quantity), temperature, and 
mechanical properties such as hardness and tensile strength. 
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Figure 5-1 Boundary Diagram 
Furthermore, the external interfaces have been structured under four 
categories, which are People, Part, Process and Plant and are identified on the 
basis that they are non-direct inputs to the process, or rather inputs to the 
process that are not directly applied towards the transformation of the part. 
This tool was completed by the team in a one hour session. With reference to 
the Boundary Diagram from the first case study, and facilitation from the author, 
part characteristics were identified logically and once defined changes in these 
factors were straightforward to uncover, when related to the function of the 
process. In order to do this the team first discussed the overall requirement of 
the process, led by the mechanical engineers and the operators, to ensure a 
universal understanding was possessed. Part characteristics were identified 
independently as either an input or an output, depending on how they relate to 
the process, but then added to the other to ensure consistency. For instance, 
temperature was identified as a requirement of the process to achieve and was 
then subsequently added as an input. The team also decided to number the 
characteristics so that they could be easily referenced. 
It was felt that by categorising external inputs the team was better enabled to 
identify them. This prompted discussion as initially machinery and tooling, such 
as the furnace and the loading tray, were identified as external causes but then 
it was resolved that these were used to directly transform the parts in terms of 
temperature and location respectively. The internal interfaces were identified on 
an informal basis by considering how the process operated.  
Output
1. Location [Freezer No] - 3
2. Material [Spec]– Al Alloy xxxx
3. Part - [Part Numbers(s)] - xxxx
4. Number [#] - xxxx
5. Temperature [⁰C] - -40
6. Hardness  [BHN] - <X 
7. Tensile Strength [MPa] - >Y
Input
1. Location [Store Bin Number] – 12-42
2. Material [Spec]– Al Alloy xxxx
3. Part - [Part Numbers(s)] - xxxx
4. Number [#] - xxxx
5. Temperature [⁰C] - Ambient
6. Hardness  [BHN] - X 
7. Tensile Strength [MPa] - Y
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5.4.1.2 Process Mapping 
In order to address the issues that were exposed in the first case study, related 
to mixed level of functional detail leading towards inconsistent identification of 
failure modes and causality, the functional decomposition from the Boundary 
Diagram was conducted through operational levels, as shown in the figure 
below.  
 
Figure 5-2 Enhanced Process Mapping 
The first level of mapping described the operations that occur in order to create 
the desired output characteristics. At this level, the part states were defined in 
relation to observable instants between operations, which demonstrate exactly 
how and when each of the part characteristics are created or changed. This is 
shown in Figure 5-2, by using nodes in between each of the operations that 
denote functions of the process. This approach was closer to the technique 
used in FMA when the System State Flow Diagram is applied. It was also 
documented that the output of one operation is the input of the subsequent 
operation.  
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The decomposition was continued iteratively to subsequent levels of detail of 
the process, for each of the operations. This enabled deeper comprehension of 
how the process achieves its requirements through an understanding of the 
functional logic within each of the process steps. This was conducted with 
stricter adherence to the literature on functional decomposition. Again, by 
recording the part characteristics between each of the operations, changes 
were identified that may have been overlooked had the mapping only been 
conducted at one level as it was in the first case study. Also, the state of a part 
characteristic was recorded even if it remained unchanged. Consequently, a 
richer appreciation of the transformation of the part was developed.  
These maps were created through a series of one hour meetings with the team. 
Initially, the level one map was produced in a single meeting. The team found it 
straightforward to break the process down into distinct operations, due to the 
boundary and internal interfaces defined previously. With significant input from 
the process operators, the high level operations were determined on the basis 
of significant transformation of the part using machinery or equipment. For 
consistency, the team decided to determine the boundary between each of 
these operations by using transportation (including loading or removal) of the 
parts as separation point. Once the operations and their sequence were 
defined, part characteristic states were documented at each step to identify how 
and when they were changed and were recorded using the same numbering 
sequence as founded in Boundary Diagram. As a result, each of the part 
characteristics was defined at each step of the process, even if it is unchanged. 
Each of the level two Process Maps was completed in subsequent one hour 
meetings, using the level one map as a guide. These were done in the same 
manner as the higher level, with each of the operations viewed as a Boundary 
Diagram to be expanded for higher resolution. Once all of the maps were 
completed, each of the operations was numbered to provide for numerical 
identification.  
5.4.1.3 P – Diagram 
Another addition to the MFMA framework was the P Diagram.  Figure 5-3 
shows an example from Operation 20.2. This tool was introduced to support 
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identification of the sources of variation and the control required at each 
process step, after it was found that there was a lack of structure in the previous 
implementation.  
 
Figure 5-3 P Diagram 
 
The process step and its boundary were directly imported from the Process 
Maps. Firstly, by considering the outcomes of the process that were alternative 
to those previously defined in the required outputs, the team were able to 
identify the ‘Error States’ of the process function. Controls that are used to 
achieve the process requirements are recorded along with the factors that are 
potentially variable, which are known as ‘Noise Factors’.  
This represents the first linkage between the part and the process, as after 
defining the required part characteristic, the error states are related to process 
requirements that are achieved by controls and compromised by the noise 
factors within the process. 
The team found some aspects of the P Diagrams challenging to complete. 
Identifying error states was straight forward, as it was supported by the part 
characteristic required and therefore uncovering how the process would fail to 
achieve this was natural. However, confusion occurred when differentiating 
Operation 20.2
Heat Rivets 
Noise Factors
Rivet temperature on entry
Furnace temperature uniformity
Furnace temperature at beginning of heating
Thermal expansion of rivets
Controls
Time in furnace [mins]
Furnace temperature [⁰c] 
Error States
Rivets not heated
Rivets heated too low <490⁰c
Rivets heated too high >500 ⁰c
Rivets heated too long >40mins
Rivets heated too short <40mins
Not all rivets heated
Output
1. Location []- Basket, Tray, Furnace
2. Material [Spec] - Al Alloy xxxx
3. Part [Part Number] - xxxx
4. Number [#] - xxxx
5. Temperature [⁰c] - 495 ± 5
6. Hardness [BHN] - <X 
7. Tensile Strength [MPa] - >Y 
Input
1. Location [] - Basket, Tray, Furnace
2. Material [Spec] - Al Alloy xxxx
3. Part [Part Numbers] - xxxx
4. Number [#] - xxxx
5. Temperature [⁰c] - Rising to furnace 
6. Hardness [BHN] - X 
7. Tensile Strength [MPa] - Y 
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between controls and noise factors. The team frequently added process factors 
that should be controlled in each process step rather than what was capable. As 
a result, sources of variation were regularly mislabelled as controls. It was 
agreed that, consistent with the definitions in Section 2.2, control factors would 
relate to what the engineer can actively control during the process step and that 
noise factors would be defined as variations that couldn’t be controlled by the 
engineer within the step and that would comprise the process to achieve its 
requirement.   
5.4.1.4 Process Flow Diagram 
Figure 5-4 shows how the addition of P Diagram supports the information flow 
which underpins the MFMA framework and provides the structure for the 
Process Flow Diagram as the Process Map did in the previous case study.  
 
Figure 5-4 Process Flow Diagram and information flow from P Diagram 
The process function and graphical flow was unchanged from the Process Map, 
as are the part characteristics, with the difference in this implementation being 
that all characteristics are recorded rather than only those that are created or 
changed in the specific operation. The sources of variation were directly 
inputted from the noise factors identified using the P Diagram, with the benefit 
of considering the error states that could be outputted from the process. The 
process characteristics, which are the inputs used to transform the part and 
meet the process requirements, were added to the Process Flow Diagram with 
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Output
1. Location []- Basket, Tray, Furnace
2. Material [Spec] - Al Alloy xxxx
3. Part [Part Number] - xxxx
4. Number [#] - xxxx
5. Temperature [⁰c] - 495 ± 5
6. Hardness [BHN] - <X 
7. Tensile Strength [MPa] - >Y 
Input
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2. Material [Spec] - Al Alloy xxxx
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an input from the P Diagram also. In this extract, as is often the case, they are 
the same as the controls but often additional inputs are identified that create 
part characteristics.  
Further supported by these additional inputs, the Process Flow Diagram 
operated in the same manner as before, by promoting a detailed expansion of 
the Process Map and adding specific technical information to each of the 
operations in an all up table format at the level of resolution defined in the 
functional decomposition.  
This document was completed by the team through two, one hour meetings. 
The support of the P Diagram and the previous tools was beneficial for the 
creation of this table as the inward information flow was very strong and 
ensured that large aspects of the tool were populated by default. However, the 
team still took the time to review this information with the process documented 
in totality at this level, to check for consistency and appropriateness of 
information. Process characteristics were added where necessary, when they 
weren’t identified as controls on the P Diagram.  
5.4.1.5 Characteristics Matrix 
The Characteristics Matrix, which proved effective at identifying part to process 
linkages in the first case study, remained largely unchanged in structure other 
than including all of the part characteristics, which have been tracked 
consistently through both the process and the MFMA framework, as shown in 
Figure 5-5.  
The team found this tool and its population to be a worthwhile exercise as it 
uncovered relationships between the process that were present but not 
intentional and therefore lead to a greater understanding of the subtler 
interfaces. However, it was found to be costly, taking a lot of time to complete, 
and confusing due to the scale of the matrix (only a small extract is shown). The 
strategy that the team employed was to work through the matrix diagonally, 
identifying the relationships that were intended and then assessing the impacts 
these had on the rest of the process, both in terms of part characteristics on the 
vertical axes and process characteristics on the horizontal axes. This approach 
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encouraged consideration of potential failure mode causes and effects which is 
crucial for the next step in the MFMA framework. This tool required four, one 
hour sessions for completion. 
 
Figure 5-5 Characteristics Matrix and information flow from Process Flow Diagram 
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5.4.2 Step 2 – Process Failure Mode Identification 
5.4.2.1 Process FMEA 
The Process FMEA was completed with substantial support from the previously 
used tools and exercises as shown in Figure 5-6. In addition to the 
Characteristic Matrix and the Process Flow Diagram applied in the first case 
study, this example benefitted from the inclusion of the P Diagram, which added 
clarity in determining noise factors or sources of variation and even more so in 
terms of the potential error states identified during its development.  
 
Figure 5-6 Process FMEA and supporting information flow 
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were related to the ability of the process to meet its requirements, rather than 
directly passing over these into the causes that may have lead the furnace to 
meet its requirements, which should be represented at a further level of 
abstraction. 
The team benefitted from the structure established in Step 1 of the MFMA 
framework when completing the Process FMEA. Having the process and its 
requirements broken down in this manner allowed their time to be used more 
effectively, as the Process FMEA was divided into distinct process steps and 
their individual requirements and had the support of previous analysis prior to 
the start of the exercise. The Severity and likelihood of Occurrence were rated 
using the same criteria as the first case study, as it was deemed appropriate. 
The Process FMEA was completed in 15 hours, with a mix of one and two hour 
meetings, based on the availability of the team members.  
5.4.3 Step 3 – Process Improvement 
Figure 5-7 shows how the Process FMEA was used to manage process 
improvements in Step 3. By clearly defining the failure modes, the Process 
FMEA provides clear scope for the design and deployment of robust 
countermeasures to prevent the failure modes and their effects.  
 
Figure 5-7 Information flow between FMEA and Process Improvements  
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Through the Process FMEA, the problem statement for the improvement action 
was succinctly defined in relation to the process requirement, and consequently 
contextualised. For instance, the rivets are too hard because the Furnace 
temperature is too low.  
The Severity and Occurrence ratings of each failure mode allow prioritisation of 
the improvement effort. Thus, in this example, the process failure mode of the 
rivets being heated below the required temperature poses a greater risk to the 
process function than only having some of the rivets heated. 
There are many tools and process used for problem solving and improvement, 
but these methods and techniques were not the focus of this case study. 
Instead the intent was to provide a framework which they can be based around 
to ensure efficient application and the greatest return in terms of specific 
process control. This step demonstrated how the output of the Process FMEA 
provides scope and prioritisation for these techniques, addressing the common 
pitfalls that are associated with them. While these tools are normally applied in 
conjunction with specific problems identified with a process, they can also be 
deployed at the process design stage, and integrated with the MFMA 
framework. 
5.4.3.1 Machinery FMEA and Control Plan 
As shown in Figure 5-7, specific failure causes provided scope for the 
development of preventative controls at a level which can be engineering and 
implemented. In this example, the failure modes are the result of the machinery 
potentially affecting the process’ ability to meet its requirements. A cause at this 
level becomes a failure mode at a machinery level, which prompts a Machinery 
FMEA to be developed in order to understand how this failure could occur and 
to develop controls to prevent it migrating into the process level, causing a 
process failure. This translation of the failure mode into another level is 
characteristic of the cascade between domains in Axiomatic design, as 
described in the literature. In this instance, the cause of a failure mode in the 
‘process domain’ has been transposed into a ‘machinery domain’. Investigating 
this failure mode at this level may consequently transfer the cause of failure at a 
machinery level into a failure mode at a level associated with the design of the 
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equipment. As a result, process failure modes are understood from the bottom 
up, through the various levels that are required for the process’ operation 
ensuring the countermeasures to failure are fully robust in their design. 
The system for controlling the machinery is described in a Machinery Control 
Plan, describing the actions necessary to allow the equipment to be in a 
continual state of control, and the relevant outputs flow back into the Process 
FMEA, recorded as preventative controls used to reduce the risk of the process 
failure mode. In this instance, these controls come in the form of a scheduled 
maintenance plan which is implemented as a result of this requirement.  
The ability of the control to prevent the cause of failure occurring is then rated 
using the Detection scale and input into the Process FMEA. Consequently, the 
RPN for the failure mode can be calculated and its total risk is quantified.  
5.4.3.2 Process Capability Study 
Figure 5-7 also shows how the Process FMEA can be used to initiate process 
capability studies. Through Steps 1 and 2, critical process characteristics have 
been identified, particularly in the Characteristics Matrix which illustrates the 
relationships between the process and the parts. The Process FMEA 
contextualises these characteristics in terms of process failures, and prioritises 
them. Consequently, the starting point of a process capability or Six Sigma 
variability reduction exercise has been achieved; to select the relevant quality 
characteristic and define the problem. 
This provides scope to develop a Data Collection Plan, which requires the 
selection of an appropriate Control Chart and details the measurables the will 
be recorded and at what frequency. These represent steps 3 – 5 in Doty’s 
(1996) methodology for constructing Control Charts. Subsequently, control 
limits can be set and assessed as data is obtained, and the process’ 
performance can be monitored for trends that indicate when it is unstable or 
heading out of control. Alternatively, if the DMAIC Six Sigma methodology is 
applied, this would refer to the Measure phase, allowing the subsequent 
Analysis, Improvement and Control phases to be completed. 
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In this case, the temperature uniformity can be measured using thermocouples. 
By this means, the MFMA framework ensures that process inputs, such as 
temperature, are measured rather than process outputs which means control 
measures are used preventatively rather than reactively which is accordant with 
the literature best practice.   
The system of data collection and use of the outputs of the Control Chart are 
embodied into the Machinery Control Plan, as depicted in Figure 5-7 which 
facilitates control of the furnace through process intervention when the control 
limits are breached.  
In this case study, these process improvement actions were not fully 
established. This was due to the resource required for the scale of these 
actions, which would vastly out stretch what is feasible in the scope of this 
study. However, the opportunities were explored by the team and the 
mechanics investigated which would allow for continuation outside the scope of 
this research case study. For example, the relevant line items of the Machinery 
FMEA were completed. 
5.4.4 Step 4 – Process Control and Validation 
Once the countermeasures and controls required to prevent and to detect the 
failures identified on the Process FMEA are defined, a Process Control Plan 
was created. This is used to implement and verify the improvements, by 
detailing how the systems that are used to control the process are implemented 
for ongoing control.   
Figure 5-8 demonstrates how the information developed through the course of 
the MFMA framework led into the Process Control Plan. The process step and 
function have flowed directly from the Process FMEA, using the structure 
developed during Step 1 of the MFMA framework that has flowed throughout 
the procedure. The machine, process characteristics and process specification 
columns have also been populated with information gathered in Step 1, which in 
this case was first documented in the Process Flow Diagram. The measurement 
technique, sample information, control method and reaction plan details have 
come from the process improvements developed in Step 3.  
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Figure 5-8 Information Flow into Process Control Plan 
Consequently, the Process Control Plan is a summary of the actions required 
for process control that have resulted from the previous steps of the MFMA 
framework. Consequently, these actions are categorised by each process step 
and cover its functional requirements. This ensured that all of the potential 
failure modes identified are covered, but also that the document remained 
consistent, concise and manageable. Also, justification has been provided for 
each of the improvements that have been developed as they can be traced 
through the MFMA framework to provide evidence of their requirement and 
influence on the process. 
The Process Control Plan is a living document and as the methods it describes 
are performed, their effectiveness can be monitored by observing the outputs 
from the process. If the countermeasures to failure are not fully effective, then 
the Process FMEA can be revisited and MFMA Steps 3 and 4 conducted 
iteratively.  
In summary, the Process Control Plan has provided a checklist of the activities 
that need to be carried out in order to maintain process control, in relation to the 
avoidance of previously identified potential failure modes. Through the flow of 
information and structure provided by the MFMA framework, the pitfalls 
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associated with Process FMEA activities not leading to control methods and 
potential design changes have been addressed.  
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Outcomes of Case Study 2 
The second case study has provided validation for the proposed MFMA 
framework, by applying it in totality after the first two steps were initially trialled 
in a pilot case study and opportunities for improvement were identified. Here the 
outcomes of the study are discussed, with particular emphasis on the novelties 
of this implementation. 
The enhancements made to the Boundary Diagram for the second case study 
have shown to be positive. By recording additional characteristics of the part, 
other than just the geometric features which was permissible in the previous 
study, the Boundary Diagram was richer and allowed the process, in terms of 
the changes made to the part, to be understood in greater depth. Identifying the 
characteristics at one end of the process, either as an input or an output, 
prompted their consideration not only at the alternate end but throughout the 
process, as achieved by Process Mapping and functional decomposition. As a 
result, it is clear this addition had a positive effect on mapping characteristics 
which allowed more interrelationships to be considered when completing the 
Characteristic Matrix, providing greater structure throughout the MFMA 
framework. Furthermore, considering the external interfaces in terms of People, 
Plant, Process and Part led to their identification being suitably organised and 
provided a context that allowed them to be covered. 
In the second case study, the process was functionally decomposed through 
two levels of abstraction from that defined at the boundary level. This was 
initiated after the first case study showed that there was insufficient 
understanding of the process to link failure modes to their cause with 
consistency, as process failure modes were attributed to causes at a machinery 
level. Consistent with the guidelines provided by the Department of Defence 
(2001), deconstructing the process into different levels proved effective for 
understanding the function of the process. This is crucial in the complex 
environment of aerospace manufacture where numerous manufacturing 
operations are interactive with one another and a variety of interrelationships 
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and dependencies exist which exacerbates identification of variants and 
understanding of their resultant effect on the output. This is in accordance with 
Bartolomei et al., (2012), who discuss how an incomplete or distorted view of a 
system’s behaviour can occur when an inappropriate level of detail is selected 
for analysis.  
The introduction of the P Diagram has also been beneficial. Sequentially, it 
naturally follows on from the Process Maps, which individually defines the 
process’ functional steps with their input and output. Consequently, in keeping 
with the other tools in the MFMA framework, there is a strong inward flow of 
information to support the tools completion, as illustrated across Figure 5-2 and 
Figure 5-3. At this stage, considering process failure modes, dubbed ‘error 
states’, noise factors and controls at each process step complements the 
subsequent completion of the Process Flow Diagram, which summarises all of 
this information together with the rest of the manufacturing process. To this end 
it also supports the Process FMEA, particularly in terms of documenting failure 
modes, which were not formally considered prior to the completion of this tool in 
the previous case study. As a result, the inclusion of this tool has resulted in 
improved robustness in regard to information capture and flow within the MFMA 
framework.  
In both case studies the Characteristics Matrix, shown in Figure 4-4 and Figure 
5-5, has demonstrated part to part, part to process and process to process 
linkages very effectively. In the second case study, identification of a variety of 
part characteristics at the Boundary Diagram stage led to a richer matrix, as 
each of these characteristics are represented for each operation, unlike in the 
first case study where only geometric characteristics created at that operation 
were recorded. However, in both cases characteristics that were required by the 
process specification where captured, it is just that in the previous study these 
were geometric and in the latter they are based on material properties. It is felt 
that a more consistent approach to capturing part characteristics needs to be 
devised, as those defined on drawings and specifications (or Conditions of 
Supply) may not be exhaustive enough as to allow all process failure modes to 
be identified through causality. That said, this is possibly a failure of the 
customer-supplier relationship rather than that of the MFMA framework.  
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As a single document, the Characteristic Matrix is very useful for providing a 
summarised overview of the casual relationships within the manufacturing 
process. This is pivotal for process understanding and for analysing causes and 
effects of process failures. However, it has the potential to be a very large 
document and has relied on appropriate scoping and scaling of the process to a 
manageable level so that it does not extend beyond what can be feasibly 
populated. Therefore, it is arguably a testament to the proceeding steps of the 
MFMA framework that it is able to be utilised effectively.  
The completion of the Process FMEA, as illustrated in Figure 5-6, highlights the 
effectiveness and individual value of each of the other applied tools, but also 
illustrates how they are greater than the sum of their parts as the information 
they generate converges. Process data is provided efficiently to allow this tool 
to be populated concisely and consistently but also thoroughly. Functionally 
deconstructing the process means that the material for the first two columns of 
the document is pre-existing and directly transfers inwardly from the Process 
Flow Diagram. This alone is a huge step towards containment of what can 
potentially be a very large and time expensive document and improves the 
integrity of the information it holds when compared to the conventional 
approach, underpinned by brainstorming. 
Continuing to consider the Process FMEA from left to right, the potential failure 
modes are inputted from the P Diagram. By previously isolating the distinct 
process requirements, and assessing potential failures in this context, failure 
modes are correctly attributed to the operation in which they can occur as 
opposed to when they might be discovered. This principle is also supported by 
the Characteristics Matrix, as it conveys the internal mechanics of the process 
by displaying how and when characteristics are altered, changed or used. 
Through this means, the Characteristics Matrix gives structure to identify the 
effects of the failure on the downstream process operations and sheds light on 
where, when and by what means the potential failure would be detected by the 
process, as it operates in its current state. For example, if a feature created at 
one step is required for location at a latter, or when an operator would first be 
exposed to a component after a failure mode could potentially have occurred. 
Not only does this facilitate appreciation of the pre-existing detective methods 
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that naturally exist within the process, but it identifies what the effects of the 
failure are.  
Potential causes of the failure mode are supported by the Sources of Variation 
recorded on the Process Flow Diagram, the Noise Factors on the P Diagram 
and the Process Parameters on the Characteristics Matrix. These sources of 
information include process inputs that can and can’t be readily controlled. As a 
result, the MFMA framework includes causes of failures associated with 
undesired inputs or variables beyond a state of control as well as failures that 
occur as a consequence of a failure within an incidental system, be it tooling, 
machinery or a process within the manufacturing process that consequently 
needs to be analysed at an increased level of detail.  
The second case study illustrated how the Process FMEA provides a direct 
input into process improvements that will improve the reliability and robustness 
of the process. Identifying a potential failure mode specifically related to the 
requirement of the process allows improvement activity to be relevant to the 
control of the process, rather than having tools such as process capability 
studies or Six Sigma projects applied without context. Antony (2004) and 
Nonthaleerak and Hendry (2008) highlight the issues associated with this 
behaviour, describing how the identification and definition of process 
improvements is challenging and costly. Consequently, the Process FMEA 
details precisely what the process needs to achieve, how it could fail to achieve 
this and what the effects could be, whilst also providing a priority scale of which 
are the most critical failures through the Risk Priority Number. Therefore, the 
inheritance of the improvement action has been provided with a strong and 
clearly scoped problem statement, addressing problems detailed both in the 
literature and in the Company’s current practice.  
It must be made clear that Process Capability or Six Sigma Studies are not the 
only improvement activities that can occur as a result of using the MFMA 
framework. The extracts in the second case study show a failure mode 
associated with capability of the furnace to maintain a uniform temperature 
within the process specification. In this instance, a Process Capability Study 
provides an effective method of monitoring the furnace’s performance and 
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prevents processing rivets when the process is not able to heat them as 
required. However, the countermeasures in this area can be anything from the 
redesign of tooling, to introduction of a Poka-Yoke or error proofing device, 
additional training of staff or, if the risk is perceived as insignificant, doing 
nothing at all.  
In the final step, the outputs of the improvement activities are inputted back into 
the MFMA framework. This addresses the recorded issue of FMEA studies not 
leading to Process Control Plans and improvement. The information flow within 
the MFMA framework has led to control methods being identified in relation to 
failure modes that they are trying to prevent in a clear and consistent way. This 
also ensures that the Process Control Plan contains detailed instruction related 
to each of the process failure modes identified. The process step and function 
are recorded with the means by which this is achieved, how these are controlled 
and the escalation required if the process strays out of control. 
6.2 Review of MFMA Framework 
Figure 6-1 provides an overview of the MFMA framework that has been 
developed as a result of the two case study implementations, and illustrates the 
four high level steps, their objectives, the tools that are used to achieve them 
and the information flows between them which are the characteristic features of 
the framework. 
 
Figure 6-1 Overview of the MFMA Framework with flows of information illustrated 
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This framework has been developed based on the four higher level steps of the 
FMA framework, as presented by Campean and Henshall (2009). Through the 
case studies, detailed guidelines have been established for the implementation 
of this framework. Existing process tools have been developed, particularly the 
Characteristics Matrix, and sequenced in order to enable a flow of information 
that supports their completion and contextualises them within the framework as 
a whole.   
In order to review the effectiveness and suitability of this framework, it is 
necessary to return to each of the research questions provided in Section 3.4.2. 
These are referred to under the following headings. 
6.2.1 Managing Complexity 
Through the completion of two case study applications, on real life 
manufacturing processes, it has been demonstrated that the MFMA framework 
is effective at supporting the analysis of complex manufacturing procedures by 
providing a structure to guide the investigation which leads into the 
development of specific process control methods. This has been shown by 
completion of each of the tools, which are demonstrated in the extracts 
displayed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Together, the case studies have shown that using the Boundary Diagram to 
define the manufacturing process at the first step has allowed the analysis to be 
contained, which is demonstrated through the completion of the subsequent 
tools and methods. Setting these limits early on prevents scope creep during 
the detailed analysis, which can be disruptive and time consuming.  
Once the boundary has been set, analysis of the process within these limits has 
been facilitated using the Process Maps. Through iterative functional 
decomposition, akin to the methods used for system analysis covered in the 
literature review (Department of Defence (2001), Mendling et al. (2008), 
(Campean et al., 2011)), the process is deconstructed through a series of levels 
of abstraction from the original, high level function described in the Boundary 
Diagram. These levels allow the team to focus on the process in distinct 
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operations, which is manageable but consistent within the context of the 
overriding requirement of the manufacturing system. A constant numbering 
format along with simple protocols for defining and describing operations has 
enabled this approach. 
6.2.2 Information Flow 
Inspired by FMA, the MFMA framework has been designed to facilitate a flow of 
information between the tools so that they can be completed efficiently and 
concisely, whilst minimising unstructured brainstorming.  
As shown in Figure 6-1, there is a clear information flow from the beginning to 
the end of the MFMA framework that connects every tool. The part 
characteristics that define the state of the input and the output of the process 
are identified and recorded at the initiation of the framework and can be traced 
throughout the entire procedure.  
As noted in both the case studies, including the second which featured the 
additional P Diagram, other than the Boundary Diagram, none of the tools start 
as a blank, as information from a preceding tool can populate multiple elements 
of the subsequent tool. When completing each of the tools it is straightforward 
to understand what information is intended to be added and it builds 
sequentially on that provided from its predecessor. The flow of information 
provides a narrative and contextualises each of the tools and their objectives 
and as a result, their output is greater than the sum of their parts. As each tool 
leads to another, they are more purposeful and there is a direct linkage between 
the work required to complete them and the actions that result. Consequently, 
the flow of information addresses issues found with exercises being completed 
without support and to no avail. This is particularly true of FMEAs as standalone 
documents which are commonly difficult to comprehend, time consuming to 
complete and from which no benefit is expected.  
6.2.3 Functional Understanding 
The MFMA framework develops an accurate understanding of the required 
functions within a manufacturing process. This is achieved as a result of the 
functional decomposition, previously described in this discussion for its 
effectivity at managing the complexity of the process. 
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The process functions are determined during the decomposition by assessing 
the requirements of the process that are described in terms of the part states 
before and after each step. This clearly defines the transformation that must be 
achieved by the process. As the process is documented at levels of increasing 
resolution, the functional mechanics by which it achieves its objective become 
more refined. Consequently, the specifications of various aspects of the process 
including the operators and machinery become known. This technique is 
essential when identifying the root cause of failure modes and analysing the 
relationships between process characteristics and part characteristics that 
achieve the process function.  
6.2.4 Identification and Prevention of Failure Modes 
As the MFMA framework leads into the Process FMEA in a step by step, 
pragmatic fashion, this regulates information generation and discussion at an 
appropriate rate and creates a shared understanding before the Process FMEA 
is begun. When contrasted with the historic method of approaching FMEA 
studies, and the associated pitfalls described in Section 2.6.6, the MFMA 
framework allows the FMEA to be completed much more efficiently and 
concisely.  
MFMA offers opportunities for brainstorming and ‘off the wall’ thinking within set 
boundaries, which lessens the effects found using Advanced FMEA and its 
binary approach that was found to limit teams thinking to items closely related to 
the process model. 
By having a defined step after the failure analysis half of the FMEA, MFMA 
ensures that the prevention of failure modes is addressed and that there is an 
output of the study. 
6.2.5 Feasibility of Deployment within the Company 
Functionally, the MFMA framework has demonstrated that it can feasibly be 
deployed within the Company. The information required to complete each of the 
tools in Step 1 should be obtainable and pre-existing in some form within the 
Business, either in part drawings, process specifications, ‘Conditions of Supply’, 
machinery guidelines, maintenance plans, industry standards and so forth, or in 
the knowledge of the employees. 
107 
 
Furthermore, although some form of investment will be required for the training 
necessary to familiarise users with the principles, toolsets and mechanisms of 
the MFMA framework, there is no expensive hardware or software needed in 
order to begin using the methodology. The Company currently provide training 
on some tools that are present within the MFMA framework. For example, 
Process Mapping is conducted as part of cross functional teams. Whilst these 
tools may presently be used in a slightly different format and structure to that in 
MFMA, it suggests that their introduction will not come as a radical addition. 
Also, employees will be familiar with the concept of improvement projects, with 
Six Sigma studies beginning conducted within the Company to some degree, 
and therefore should be aware of the need for their input into team meetings. 
Further to these points, the impacts of completing the MFMA framework with a 
team within the Company are discussed in detail in Section 6.3. 
Therefore, there should be no hard or bodily resistance to the introduction of the 
MFMA framework. The most significant barrier, as is often the case with the 
introduction of new strategies, will be cultural, associated with communicating 
the need for such a framework, convincing others that the benefits can be 
realised and securing the required buy in to allow the implementations to prove 
successful.  
6.2.6 MFMA Limitations 
Unquestionably, one of biggest disadvantages of the MFMA framework is that it 
comes at a significant time expense. Getting teams together, discussing the 
various aspects of the process, collating information and maintaining all of the 
documentation means that projects are likely to span over months, even for a 
relatively short process.  
Another difficultly associated with the MFMA framework is the management of 
all the documentation. Some of the documents have a tendency to become very 
large, which can make them hard to view particularly when during a team 
meeting. This is typically true of the FMEA, although this can be still be 
conveniently printed and viewed in a relevant section, but the Characteristics 
Matrix is more of a challenge to demonstrate in totality as this expands in both 
the horizontal and vertical axes. Furthermore, as the MFMA framework is used 
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it is likely to go through iterations and reviews of the information that populates 
the tools. Maintaining consistency between each of the tools, so that they are all 
representing the most up to date data and analysis, can require a lot of time. 
These difficulties provide clear opportunity for the development of software that 
can link the tools together so that changes to on one tool are automatically 
made on the relevant documents. This would also enable tools to be 
automatically populated. The second case study demonstrates how part 
characteristics and process operations are consistent enough to facilitate the 
development of such a solution.  
Despite the structure that is provided by the MFMA framework, the success of 
the analysis is only as good as the individuals that conduct it; true of both the 
team members and the facilitator. It is dependent on reliable data being 
provided in order to give the best results. However, this weakness is 
commonplace for any method or system of analysis, as at some point there will 
be some level of reliance on human input in order to be effective. Therefore, this 
is not a limitation that is unique to MFMA. 
6.3 Team Influence 
Completing the second case study with the help of a team has proved to be an 
effective exercise and has shown that the MFMA framework could feasibly be 
performed by personnel within the Company. Throughout the second case 
study, it was demonstrated that the tools are of a manageable size to be 
populated by a team together, and the information they require can realistically 
be obtained from staff members within a meeting, whilst occasionally requiring 
consultation of process documentation and standards. 
The tools provide structure for team meetings, as each of them have a clear 
objective and the way that they build on information and analysis generated 
through the previous step allows the requirement from the team to be 
contextualised. As a result, other than the initial Boundary Diagram which starts 
the MFMA framework, none of the tools begin as a blank and consequently this 
minimises the level of brainstorming, which leads to inefficiency in process 
analysis. Furthermore, as the MFMA framework has broken down the 
acquisition of information for the central Process FMEA through the use of the 
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individual tools, the team meetings have an achievable objective and a clear 
focus that is tangible to the team members. This is clearly advantageous over 
working towards the completion of what is effectively an endless Process 
FMEA. Also, the progress of the team against each of the tools can be easily 
understood, as the scope of the analysis is maintained, but refined and divided 
throughout the MFMA framework. This is particularly true of the Characteristic 
Matrix and the FMEA. The Characteristic Matrix can be drawn up as soon as 
the Process Flow Diagram is completed and should not require significant 
addition or removal of line items throughout its completion. This means that 
extent of the document and the progress against its completion is immediately 
obvious. As for the FMEA, the functional decomposition of the process into 
operations provides a measure for progress as each is completed. These are 
minor aspects of the framework but, in terms of completing work as a team and 
managing the work as a project, with progress reports potentially required to 
senior management, these are useful additions. 
Completing the tools together prompts the discussion of the process’ operation. 
This promotes critical and abstract thinking between the team as it provides an 
opportunity for the different members to communicate their views and challenge 
the views of others as information is gathered to populate the tools. This does 
prove costly in terms of time and it is evident that conducting the first case study 
as an individual allowed things to progress quicker and more readily. However, 
it is arguable that this debate and exchange of knowledge is where the real 
value in team work lies, as a shared appreciation and understanding of the 
process from other stakeholder’s perspectives is undoubtedly beneficial to the 
successful operation of the process. Furthermore, it is crucial that this common 
understanding, as well as the language that comes with it, is developed leading 
up to the FMEA, if it is to be completed most effectively. It would be interesting 
to observe a scenario where a single team member joined in at the FMEA 
stage, without participating in the functional analysis completed by the rest of 
the team.      
Delays and complications are also experienced when having to schedule and 
reschedule meetings in response to the team members’ availability, which can 
lead to inconsistent gaps between sessions. This experience is not likely to be 
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so detrimental in future practice for several reasons. Firstly, MFMA will have the 
greatest impact when applied during the planning of a new process, at which 
point the team involved would be entirely focussed on this task, rather than in 
this case study where this was additional and separate to their day to day work. 
Also, regardless of the timing of the application, it is believed that the meetings 
would have been able to have a greater priority to the team if this was not a 
developmental activity. It is advisable that if the framework is adopted fully, that 
the facilitator is of significant seniority to facilitate a timetable of sessions.  
Furthermore, as the team collaborates to complete each of the tools they create 
their own rules and definitions to use throughout the MFMA framework. This 
was observed during the Process Mapping exercises in the second case study, 
as it was agreed by the team as a whole that, as a standard, they would 
separate different process operations by transportation activities at the first level 
of abstraction from the Boundary Diagram.   
6.4 Comparisons with FMA 
As intended, the MFMA framework has adopted the four higher level steps and 
underlying philosophy of FMA. These principles have worked well, which is 
unsurprising. Understanding the system before identifying potential failures and 
subsequently designing and implementing countermeasures is a logical 
methodology, regardless of whether it is in relation to a product or a process.  
Furthermore, MFMA has inherited the functional approach to systems analysis, 
as used in FMA. Where FMA uses the System State Flow Diagram, MFMA 
uses functional Process Mapping to deconstruct the process into a hierarchy 
until an appropriate level for analysis is achieved. In FMA, the ‘appropriate level’ 
is achieved when the function can be achieved by hardware. In MFMA, the level 
is less precise. In some instances, when machinery is used to meet 
requirements the same definition can be applied, but often transformations in 
manufacturing have more human interactions than in system design. MFMA has 
also used a flow of information between the tools that is a defining feature of 
FMA. 
Within the first step, MFMA requires a more rigid and sequential approach to 
FMA, which can be begun with either the Boundary Diagram, System State 
111 
 
Flow Diagram, Interface Matrix or Function Tree as stated by Campean and 
Henshall (2009). In MFMA, it is clearly essential that the Boundary Diagram is 
used first to define the beginning and the end of the process before it is 
deconstructed, and the part and process characteristics and their relationship 
are analysed. Fundamentally, the process would not work if the tools were not 
ordered in this way. Of course, each of the tools can be used iteratively at this 
stage, being revisited and updated as more knowledge is gained, but they still 
need to be approached in this order. 
6.5 Suitability of Case Studies 
The case studies have provided an effective environment for the MFMA 
framework to be trialled upon. Both the processes that have been used are real 
manufacturing processes that the Company operates, and therefore provide 
‘real life’ validation in terms of the information that the framework would be 
expected to hold.  
However, the framework has only been applied to existing processes at this 
stage. Although, this was appropriate for this research, in order to properly test 
the effectiveness of the MFMA framework in the environment where it can have 
the largest potential impact, it needs to be trailed during the development of a 
manufacturing process. Furthermore, the case studies have not demonstrated 
fully the improvements have been made and the effects that these have had on 
process performance, but this was never the intent. Rather than illustrate the 
effectiveness of the improvements that can be made to a process, the motive 
was to develop a process that can be used towards making processes robust to 
failure and to that aim the case studies have been suitable. 
The case studies selected for this research have both been used for component 
manufacture. The MFMA framework requires testing in sub assembly and final 
assembly scenarios in order to assess its ability as a generic method that can 
be universally applied. These manufacturing environments will further assess 
the frameworks ability to manage complexity as multiple parts and fixtures come 
together and interact with one another, with potential failure modes different to 
those at detail manufacture. This may lead to the identification of additional 
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casual relationships between the parts and the process, which might require 
redesign of some MFMA tools such as the Characteristics Matrix.  
Furthermore, as the two case studies did not apply an identical MFMA 
framework, as the second was use to incorporate improvements to the 
weaknesses identified in the first, the ability of them to act in a truly replicative 
form and to add robustness to the results is slightly compromised. However, as 
the majority of the applied framework was identical and an additional case study 
allowed extra facets to be incorporated and improvements trialled, it is 
perceived as justifiable.    
6.6 Advancements on Literature 
This research has made several advancements to the literature surveyed in 
Section 2. Most significantly, it has demonstrated that the FMA framework, as 
presented by Campean and Henshall (2009), can be taken and adapted for use 
in a manufacturing process context. This provides evidence to suggest that the 
underlining principles and strategy of FMA are fundamental and consequently 
can potentially be applied to improving robustness in a variety of systems.  
In more specific terms, the MFMA framework has made indirect progression on 
the Advanced FMEA procedure developed by Kmenta et al., (1999). Despite 
operating slightly differently, the MFMA framework uses a similarly function 
based approach to that used in Advanced FMEA, but it is one that is less 
restrictive. However, the MFMA framework provides the opportunity to ‘close 
the loop’ with Step 3 and 4 used to design, develop and implement the 
countermeasures to failure; something that is vacant in Advanced FMEA.   
Furthermore, the Characteristics Matrix developed and deployed in this 
research demonstrates notable expansion on those provided by Carrión et al. 
(2007) and Ford Design Institute (2004). In the case study extracts provided it is 
not only clear that there is greater opportunity to add information, such as 
metrics for both part and process characteristics, but also that the data is 
greater refined.  The result is that linkages and interrelationships within the 
process are more visible and can be identified and analysed at a more detailed 
resolution. 
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Finally, the full and consistent mapping of process and part characteristics 
throughout the MFMA framework facilitated by the information flow between 
each of the tools and particularly clear in the second case study, shows novelty 
over procedures such as APQP and Six Sigma. 
6.7 MFMA Dissemination 
6.7.1 MFMA Process Documentation  
The MFMA process has been documented in a comprehensive handbook for 
use within the Company. Due to the size of this document, and because it is 
now owned and governed by the Company, it is inappropriate to demonstrate 
here in full within this thesis. However, an extract can be found in Appendix E. 
The MFMA framework handbook has been developed with the intention that it 
can be practically used by employees throughout the business hierarchy. There 
are high level overviews of the issues that the MFMA framework addresses and 
how this is achieved, useful for higher management, but enough detail to act as 
a full, step by step guide that staff can use to work through the process.  
In terms of content, the handbook includes the following; 
 Introduction and background 
 A high level overview of the MFMA process 
 A detailed step by step guide of the MFMA framework, including project 
management activities for the different stages and descriptions of the 
required team roles  
 Annotated worked examples of each of the tools, with a full description of 
the different elements and tips for their management and completion 
 Full case study applications of the framework on existing processes 
within the Company 
 Blank templates of each of the tools 
 Glossary of terms 
 A bibliography and further reading list 
The handbook was delivered to the Company at the closure of the KTP project 
and is owned by the Manufacturing Capability department.  
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6.7.2 Adoption by the Company 
Overall, the development of the MFMA framework has been a success for the 
Company, providing a system that can be readily adopted. This is supported by 
the following statement, quoted from the KTP Final Report which was submitted 
by both the University of Bradford and the Aerospace Company at the 
completion of the project; 
“The KTP has delivered a framework which can be used to fully 
understand the failure modes in our complex production processes. 
The framework has been developed in a way that it fits into the culture 
and workings of our Company, thus allowing it to be accepted and used 
by the team members. The delivered handbook provides all the training 
needed to use the framework.” – Industry Supervisor, KTP Final Report 
(2013). 
The MFMA framework builds on the transformation efforts that the Company 
are pursuing which have been described in Section 3.1. Fundamentally, it offers 
a strategy to shift towards preventative rather than reactive action, a transition 
from quality control to assurance, which is the step change required to facilitate 
a cost effective ramp up in production.   
At an operational level, MFMA is structured, systematic and sequential so that it 
provides rationale and maintains scope for each of the toolsets, ensuring that 
the efforts of the team are contextualised and the outputs of activities are acted 
upon. This addresses the weaknesses identified with the Company’s current 
practice of Lean and Six Sigma techniques.  
Six Sigma projects can be integrated into Step 3 of the MFMA framework, 
‘Process Improvement’. The ‘DMAIC’ process that is used by the Company can 
be easily applied at this stage, not only benefitting from the problem definition 
provided by the analysis in Steps 1 and 2, but also from the avenue to directly 
incorporate the outcomes of the study back into the production environment 
through the Process Control Plan in Step 4.  
There is significant potential for deployment of the MFMA framework within the 
Company. Due to the generic nature of the methodology and its components, it 
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seems realistic to suggest that it could be applied to business operation 
processes as well as manufacturing processes, with only minor tailoring. 
Furthermore, the framework can be adapted to host a variety of individual tools 
if preferential to the team or the context of the application. For instance, a 
Fishbone or Ishikawa Diagram could feasibly be added to aid in root cause 
analysis, permitting it is suitably placed so the overall methodology isn’t 
derailed.  
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7 Conclusions 
Aerospace manufacturers are under pressure to reduce production costs, whilst 
simultaneously increasing production rates in order to remain competitive in the 
global defence market. This market is associated with high value, low volume 
manufacturing, in which high scrap and concession rates lead to spiralling costs 
that eat into profits. Consequently, there is a requirement to produce expensive 
components and assemblies right the first time through.  
MFMA is a systematic methodology, based on FMA after its success in 
automotive system design, which has been developed to facilitate the 
identification of potential failure modes to allow their prevention through the 
implementation of countermeasures. The bottom line aim is to reduce cost by 
developing robust manufacturing processes that reduce waste and the 
associated costs.  
The MFMA framework has been developed to identify the functional 
requirements of the process in order to understand how it could fail to function. 
Consequently, corrective action can be taken in order to prevent the root cause 
of the failure from occurring leading to improved robustness and subsequent 
reductions in the cost of poor quality.  
FMEA is a tool that has been used historically to ensure reliability in product 
and process designs. However, it also has many weaknesses that have 
detracted from its success in industry. The MFMA framework uses the FMEA as 
a central tool and addresses the associated issues with this technique by 
supporting it with a number of additional engineering tools in a synergistic 
manner. The novelties of this approach in this context are;   
 The structured top-down approach to process decomposition achieved 
through functional mapping 
 The use of the P Diagram and the Process Flow Diagram to identify and 
document process noise factors, and the use of the Characteristics 
Matrix to identify part and process characteristic linkages 
 A consistent and coherent flow of information between the tools, that 
facilitates the development of a concise Process FMEA and robust 
117 
 
Process Control Plans, addressing the pitfalls of conventional FMEA 
deployment 
7.1 Main Conclusions 
This framework has been validated through two case study implementations 
and the following conclusions have been made; 
 The FMA philosophy and high level steps can be effectively applied to 
the analysis of manufacturing systems 
 The MFMA framework can be used to identify part and process linkages 
using the Process Maps, P Diagram, Process Flow Diagram and the 
Characteristic Matrix 
 The functional mapping is effective, but decomposition is required in 
order to allow the failure analysis to be conducted at an appropriate level 
so that root causes are identified correctly 
 The order of the tools is appropriate and the flow of information between 
them is strong and conductive to the analysis 
 The MFMA framework provides sufficient structure to the allow FMEAs to 
be completed efficiently and effectively without being overly restrictive 
 The MFMA framework can be completed by team members within the 
Company and the scale of the tools is appropriate  
 A Characteristic Matrix is an effective tool for the analysis of relationships 
between process and part characteristics. This tool is a very useful 
resource for identifying the cause and effect of process failure modes as 
it allows downstream and upstream influences to be identified. 
 The tools, particularly the Characteristics Matrix, have the potential to 
become large which can make them difficult to work on as a team and to 
update with changes 
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7.2 Opportunities for Further Research 
The following recommendations are made for future research; 
 An implementation of the MFMA framework should be conducted on an 
assembly process to identify the suitability of the method in this 
environment  
 The MFMA framework needs to be trailed during the development of a 
new manufacturing process to allow a full validation of the process. In 
order for the effectiveness of the MFMA framework to be thoroughly 
assessed, the costs associated with the setup and operation of the new 
process should be compared with those of an existing and comparable  
(in terms of scale, manufacturing rate, component cost and so forth) 
process. This would require the selection and comparison of key 
performance indicators between the new and existing process, which 
could include mean time between failures (MTBF), scrap rates and 
process capability indices.   
 Investigations into the best configuration of MFMA teams. This could 
include the optimum number of team members and which of the 
company roles should be represented.  
 Develop software to support the MFMA framework. This would include 
digital templates of each of the tools and it is recommended that the 
documents are linked together so that changes that are made are 
consistent across all of them. 
 Investigate the outcomes and opportunities of using FMA and MFMA in 
parallel, developing new products and the process for manufacture 
concurrently.   
 Develop the MFMA/FMA frameworks and apply to other systems outside 
of design and manufacturing. For example, business processes or I.T. 
systems. 
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A. Severity Rating Scale 
 
  
Effect Criteria: Severity of Effect Ranking
Hazardous-without warning May endanger machine or assembly operator. Very high severity ranking 
when a potential failure mode affects safe product operation and/or 
involves noncompliance with government regulation. Failure will occur 
without warning.
10
Hazardous-with warning May endanger machine or assembly operator. Very high severity ranking 
when a potential failure mode affects safe product operation and/or 
involves noncompliance with government regulation. Failure will occur with 
warning.
9
Very High Major disruption to production line. 100% of product may have to be 
scrapped. Product/item inoperable, loss of primary function. Customer very 
dissatisfied.
8
High Minor disruption to production line. Product may have to be sorted and a 
portion (less than 100%) scrapped. Product/item operable, but at a reduced 
level of performance. Customer dissatisfied.
7
Moderate Minor disruption to production line. A portion (less than 100%) of the 
product may have to be scrapped (no sorting). Product/item operable but at 
reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied. 
6
Low Minor disruption to production line. 100% of product may have to be 
reworked. Product/item operable but at reduced level of performance. 
Customer dissatisfied. 
5
Very Low Minor disruption to production line. The product may have to be sorted and 
a potion (less than 100%) reworked. Defect noticed by most customers.
4
Minor Minor disruption to production line. A portion (less than 100%) of the 
product may have to be reworked on-line but out-of-station. Defect noticed 
by average customers.
3
Very Minor Minor disruption to production line. A portion (less than 100%) of the 
product may have to be reworked on-line but in-station. Defect noticed by 
discriminating customers.
2
None No effect
1
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B. Occurrence Rating Scale 
 
 
 
  
Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates Ranking
Very High: Failure is almost inevitable ≥ 1 in 2 10
1 in 3 9
High: Generally associated with processes similar to 
previous processes that have often failed
1 in 8 8
1 in 20 7
Moderate: Generally associated with processes 
similar to previous processes which have experienced 
occasional failures, not in major proportions
1in 80 6
1 in 400 5
1 in 2000 4
Low: Isolated failures associated with similar 
processes
1 in 15,000
3
Very Low: Only isolated failures associated with 
almost identical processes
1 in 150,000
2
Remote: Failure is unlikely. No failures ever 
associated with almost identical processes
≤ 1 in 1,500,000
1
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C. Detection Rating Scale 
 
 
Detection Criteria: Likelihood the Existence of a Defect will be Detected
by Process Controls Before Nest or Subsequent Process, or 
Before Part or Component Leaves the Manufacturing or 
Assembly Location
Ranking
Almost Impossible No known controls(s) available to detect failure mode
10
Very Remote Very remote likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
9
Remote Remote likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
8
Very Low Very low likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
7
Low Low likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
6
Moderate Moderate likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
5
Moderately High Moderately high likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
4
High High likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
3
Very High Very high likelihood current control(s) will detect failure mode
2
Almost Certain Current controls(s) almost certain to detect the failure mode. Reliable 
detection controls are known with similar processes.
1
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D. Original KTP Plan 
Below is the plan originally submitted for KTP Project KTP008646. There were 
some minor changes, including the area of the second implementation, which 
were all previously agreed during Local Committee Meetings.   
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E. MFMA Handbook Extracts 
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